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Abstract
This PhD thesis considers the dynamics of fiscal policy in a two-country world 
when growth is driven by the accumulation of private capital and public in­
frastructure. I study permanent growth differentials, the dynamics of optimal 
and time-consistent policies, the issue of policy coordination, as well as the 
accumulation of debt.
©Thomas Krichel 1999. I am grateful to Paul Levine for helpful discussions at all stages 
of this work. He also suggested the title.
P o u r  H e x e
1 In tro d u c tion
One very important, if not the central debate of economics in general is the com­
parison between uncoordinated outcomes (often called equilibria) and coordinated 
ones (usually called optima). The idea that underlies that distinction is simple. In 
any social situation, one outcome arises if the situation is simply allowed to develop 
by itself. But if there is an intervention by some coordinating authority, welfare 
may improve; in fact it may also deteriorate, or the welfare of some agents may 
be improved at the expense of the welfare of others. Economists often attach little 
interest to the institutional aspects of coordination, in particularly when looking 
at coordination between autonomous agents. An example for that would be the 
coordination between governments on the international stage. However within each 
economy, the debate on the extent of cooperation becomes more focused around the 
extent and direction of state intervention. This has been one of the central subjects 
in the economic debate. The only point that everybody agrees on is that in an 
economy not everything can be done by the private hand.
My work starts from that simple point. I aggregate all measures that the state 
undertakes in the economy under the term “fiscal policy” . This implies a broad view. 
I study fiscal policy in terms of broad aggregates, an aggregate for government con­
sumption, one for government investment and one for taxation. I also take a broad 
view of the timing, and emphasise the long-run implications of policy. However 
this does not come at the expense of analytical rigour in each time period. Con­
tinuing the simple aggregative framework, I consider two agents; the private sector 
and the public sector (government). Both are optimising intertemporal objectives. 
One central feature of the thesis is to analyse fiscal policy in the context of these 
intertemporally optimising agents.
The private sector lives forever, it owns some capital stock both at home and 
abroad. Its derives income both from selling labour to firms and from the ownership 
of capital. It pays taxes on that income. In every period it will have to decide 
on how much to consume and save. The capital stock and national output are 
thought of as the same commodity, therefore capital could be consumed at any 
period, i.e., there is no positivity constraint on investment. The private sector is 
only constrained by its intertemporal budget constraint. That constraint says that 
the present value of all future expenditure must be smaller than the present value of 
all future post-tax income streams. Since the private sector pays taxes, it will have 
to make a forecast over the extent and the timing of income taxes before it makes 
its consumption/savings decision. This is not a trivial task.
The public sector is an agent that provides both a public consumption commodity 
and public investment. In principle there is only one physical commodity in each 
country. However when the state obtains some of that commodity through the 
collection of taxation, then there appears a second “commodity” that directly enters 
in the felicity function of the private sector representative agent. Similarly, when the 
state makes public investment available then there is an externality impact on the 
productivity of firms. Thus the government has a consumption/investment decision
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to solve just like the private sector has. The complication lies in the interaction 
between the two agents, both in the short run and in the long run.
In the long run, I assume that the economy reaches a steady state where all 
aggregates grow at a constant rate. The long-run growth rate in the economy is 
not fixed by technological factors but depends on the actions of both the private 
and the public sector, i.e. there is “endogenous” growth. To generate persistent 
growth, I assume an externality o f a publicly provided stock called infrastructure 
on the productivity of private capital. Using constant returns to scale assumptions, 
national output becomes a function of the private and public capital stock only. 
Since national output then only depends on accumulable factor, endogenous growth 
is possible. The crucial aspect of this type of endogenous growth model is that the 
government has an important impact on the long run behaviour of the economy. Like 
the private sector, the government faces a problem of consumption vs. savings. It can 
either spend on government consumption in the current period, thereby augmenting 
current felicity or spend on infrastructure, which increases the amount of resources 
in the next period and raises growth.
How large that rate of growth is is of key importance to welfare, but it is by no 
means the only welfare criterion. The fraction taken up by consumption in national 
income is of similar importance. It is trivial to imagine a society that is fast-growing, 
but where the share of consumption is small. That society may in fact fare worse 
in a steady state than another economy that grows less fast but where the share 
of consumption in national income is higher. Note that the welfare criterion here 
is simply that of a household born on any period in the steady state and living 
throughout her infinite life in that steady state.
The long run of endogenous growth models has been studies extensively. Many 
papers study only the long run. They examine comparative statics of policy, i.e. they 
compare steady states with various values of the policy variable. But it is important 
to note that the criterion of choice between steady states is unrealistic, because it 
implies an arbitrary choice between steady states. In some very simple systems, the 
economy is always in a balanced growth path. That is, for example, the case if  all 
stocks depreciate fully during the production period. In that case the problem faced 
in each period is identical, the initial capital stock is only a scale parameter. But as 
soon as there are more than two stocks involved in production that do not depreciate 
fully, even if  the aim of the consumer would be to get as quickly as possible to the 
steady state, there would necessarily be some transitory dynamics from the initial 
position to the steady state. This raises two problems
• Because of the complicated non-linear relationship between consumption, in­
vestment and growth, there is no analytical solution to the problem in most 
settings.
• If the private sector reacts to policy a problem of time inconsistency is likely 
to occur. This is a difficult conceptual and technical problem.
Because of the first problem there are two paths that are taken in the majority o f the 
literature. One is to look at the welfare comparison between steady states and ignore
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the transitional dynamics, or depart directly from a framework where transitory 
dynamics do not exist. Another approach is to analyse the effects of shocks that hit 
a steady state without the analysis of welfare maximisation. The second problem is 
usually assumed away, by considering that all future policy instruments can be set 
at the current period.
This thesis deals with both problems at the same time. There is off-steady- 
state maximisation and appropriate treatment of the time-inconsistency issue. It is 
the only piece of work in this that solves for a time-consistent fiscal policy in the 
presence of both transitory dynamics and forward-looking private sector behaviour 
in the absence of constraints on the usage of instruments.
That dazzling technical virtuosity apart, is there anything else that makes this 
piece worth reading? There are several more basic issues that the thesis solves or 
touches on. The most important simple issue is the question of growth divergence. 
Here I have a simple question, and a simple answer. The simple question is “Is it pos­
sible for one country to perpetually grow faster than another with which it trades?” . 
Astonishingly the answer to that question is “Yes it is, under certain conditions” . In 
the case where each economy is specialised in the production of a tradeable output, I 
show that an appropriate adjustment of the terms of trade in each period allows for 
a steady state where each country grows at different rates. But having shown that, I 
also examine a permanent asymmetric shock to a symmetric steady state that leads 
to growth divergence. For a linear approximation, I show that the utility in one 
country becomes arbitrarily low as time progresses, because consumption is reduced 
following a steady loss of foreign assets. This means essentially that although it is 
possible for countries to grow at different rates, we can not determine a linear path 
of adjustment that would lead from one steady state to another.
The thesis then examines the optimal and time-consistent policies. When I try 
to explain this to fellow economists, they usually are baffled by the idea of a time- 
inconsistency problem in a fiscal policy model. They are used to thinking about a 
time-inconsistency problem as a feature of monetary policy. In fact the problem is far 
more general than that. In any model where the private sector’s action depends on 
future government policy, the issue of time-inconsistency arises, unless the model is 
such that a decision on policy is only taken once. Most economists discuss the time- 
inconsistency problem for monetary policy issues only. This is essentially a repeated 
static situation, because the initial money stock one does start of with does not 
have a role in the model in the sense that it could be normalised to unity at the 
start of each period. Under those circumstances, the game starts anew each period, 
and the time-consistent solution involves a penalty in each period. A  mechanism 
that enforces the time-consistent policy will bring a welfare gain for all participants 
in such a situation. None of the restrictions of this simple monetary game apply 
here. First, since the government’s decision in the previous period does affect the 
productive capability in the economy in the current period, the decision to play time- 
consistent or time-inconsistent has repercussions not only on the current period but 
also on all future periods. For any fixed set of actions to be taken by all participants 
from the current period, different initial conditions will lead to different welfare.
3
Second it is not true that the time-consistent policy involves a loss in each period. 
In fact in the long run the time-consistent policy is likely to lead to higher welfare. 
This is one of the central results of this thesis. To understand this on an informal 
level, we can distinguish two scenarios.
Imagine first an optimal, time-inconsistent policy that involves “indulgence” ini­
tially, and “sacrifice” in the future. What would does the time-consistent policy look 
like? Since the reversal from indulgence to sacrifice would be not be time-consistent, 
the tendency to indulge would continue during all periods, but of course since past 
indulgence has eroded the possibility to indulge in the current period it is likely that 
as we move to the future, we indulge less in every period, because current indul­
gence reduces the possibility for future indulgence. In the long run we run down 
our opportunities to indulge to zero. Clearly the long-run welfare in such a system 
will be poor. Not only will the time-inconsistent solution be better from the initial 
point onwards, it will also do better in the long run.
But now assume that the opposite is true, that the optimal policy consists in 
making a sacrifice in the early periods and allow for indulgence in the later periods. 
Again, the policy reversal is time inconsistent. In the time-consistent solution there 
will be a sacrifice in each period, but in the later period, the sacrifice will bring 
fruit and allow for higher consumption possibilities. In that case the time-consistent 
policy brings higher welfare in the longer run than in the short run and there is 
a risk that the time-consistent policy outperforms the optimal policy in long run 
welfare.
Are most economic optimisation problems rather leading to trajectories of the 
“indulge then sacrifice” type or the “sacrifice then indulge” type? I am not aware 
of any broad study of this question, but it seems to me that the latter type is much 
more prominent than the former. The latter situation arises for instance in models 
where there is capital accumulation problem and initial capital falls short of an 
overaccumulation level. This is the situation relevant for all models in this thesis. It 
is also typically true in many models where the government can issue debt or assets 
and where the initial position of the government falls short of avoiding distortionary 
taxation at some stage in time. This is the situation examined in Section 9.
Before that section on debt, I examine the coordination issue that arises in a 
two-country model. In a model that is very close to mine, Devereux and Mansoo- 
rian (1992) show that the extent of government investment is not subject to an 
international coordination problem, but that only government consumption is. The 
spillover effect depends a great deal on the elasticity of substitution in consumption. 
For some parameters higher growth at home raises growth abroad, for some others 
higher growth at home lowers growth abroad, and for values that are in the “received 
wisdom” range the results are ambiguous. Indeed I find that for the particular cal­
ibration that I choose, and for time-consistent regimes, results are fairly close and 
the question of coordination of policy has little relevance for welfare.
Finally the issue of government debt features prominently in the last chapter of 
the thesis. Government debt is a very difficult topic of the analysis for economic 
policy based on optimising behaviour where government and private sector share
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roughly the same objectives. It has been shown time and again that when the 
government can levy debt, it is not optimal to levy positive debt but instead the 
government should be a creditor to the private sector. This makes perfect economic 
sense but it is at odds with what we observe. The problem could be addressed in 
various ways. One can follow the route of the political business cycle literature, and 
assume that there is an important gap between private and public sector. A  lot of 
different scenarios have been proposed in this literature. A ll have the same problem 
of non-robustness, in the sense that if the game is slightly changed the outcome is 
affected in an important way. Another avenue towards addressing the problem is 
to stick with the aggregative framework but to assume that there is a parametric 
difference between the private and public sector’s preferences. Usually it is assumed 
that the public sector has a higher discount rate, for example a government is facing 
elections. It has been shown that this type of assumption can generate debt but 
only if  one is prepared to make extreme assumptions about the difference between 
private and public sector discount rates. Another approach is to give up the repre­
sentative agent framework for the private sector. There have been recent efforts in 
this approach but this literature is to young too allow for meaningful conclusions on 
the debt front.
In this thesis, I do not address this problem, instead I am more concerned about 
the details of implementing solvency. A  government is solvent if the present value of 
its long-run assets is positive. In any period it is not clear how the future measures 
that close the gap between expenditure and income in the long run can be enforced 
today. This is not only a technical problem. I believe that this is in fact the most 
important conceptual issue facing fiscal policy when debt can be levied in an infinite 
horizon model. There is always another period when taxes can be raised and/or 
expenditure lowered, thus the introduction of a constraint on action in the current 
period is difficult. One idea that enforces solvency (without modeling it) is to directly 
penalise debt. That is not a very satisfactory solution since the size of the penalty 
is arbitrary and its time structure may induce the government to shift resources to 
avoid the penalty rather than for reasons that related to the primary objectives of 
policy. In this thesis I set out to introduce solvency directly, by treating the value 
of the current government debt as non-predetermined and set it equal to value that 
it would have under the solvency constraint. This novel concept of government debt 
leads to convincing model properties and results.
To summarize: this thesis studies the issues of growth asymmetry, time-consistent 
policies and policy coordination in a two-country endogenous growth model with 
government capital, with and without government debt. I first review the literature 
on these topics in Section 2. I set out the general model in Section 3. In Section 
4, I address the first issue of the paper, the existence of a steady-state equilibrium 
where both countries’ GDP grows at different rates. In Section 5, I seek an appro­
priate linear-quadratic approximation for the model. This approximation is used in 
three simulation exercises. Section 6  examines the dynamic reaction of the model to 
shocks that lead to asymmetric growth. Section 7 contains the results for optimal 
and time-consistent policies in a single country model. Section 8  examines coopera­
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tion vs. non-cooperative policies that are time-consistent. Section 9 introduces the 
issue of government debt. Section 10 concludes.
The thesis is my work only. However the solution procedures for the optimal and 
time-consistent solutions are largely based on Currie and Levine (1994). They are 
presented in Appendix A  and Appendix B.
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2 L ite ra tu re  re v iew
In this Section I review some of the literature relevant to the subject matter. In 
Subsection 2.11 look at the time-inconsistency literature. In Subsection 2 . 2  I review 
the literature on simple models of endogenous growth with public infrastructure. In 
Subsection 2.3 I examine what could be called the growth differential literature (if 
it existed). Subsection 2.4 considers the literature on debt. In the last Subsection I 
look more closely at the model whose formal structure comes closest to mine.
2.1 The literature on time inconsistency
This thesis studies fiscal policy under a time-consistency constraint. As its name 
suggests, time inconsistency arises in dynamic models. Roughly, when an agent 
makes a plan over several periods, there is an incentive to deviate from the earlier 
plan in the later periods. Therefore if there is no mechanism by which an agent can 
be forced to comply with her earlier plans, the outcome over the whole period is 
suboptimal since it does no longer correspond to the initial optimal trajectory.
In issues of economic policy, the most frequently studied problem is the one of 
a government that faces a forward-looking private sector. I f  the government is able 
to precommit to any path for the variables under its control, then the government 
adopts a standard decision-making problem involving an intertemporal objective. In 
that case it can immediately influence the private sector’s intertemporal behaviour. 
Otherwise the government will be reoptimising in each period. In that case the 
impact of the policy on the private sector will be more limited, because the private 
sector will expect the government to reoptimise.
Academic economists have long been worried about time inconsistency, to the 
extent that a majority seems to perceive time inconsistency as a problem that begs 
a solution. One important reason for this view is that students of economics are 
familiarized with the issue within the framework of stabilisation policy. A  typical 
example is the following story. There is a government that would like to stimulate 
national output, but keep inflation low. It operates in an environment where only 
surprise inflation can increase output. The public formulates rational expectations. 
Therefore the optimal outcome is not to inflate; however that outcome is not time- 
consistent. I f  the public were to believe in the promise of low inflation then the 
government would have an incentive to create surprise inflation. Thus time incon­
sistency leads to a dead-weight loss because society ends up in an equilibrium with 
costly inflation that is anticipated, and therefore yields no output gain. When we 
repeat that game in this type of model the time inconsistency of the no-inflation 
decision makes for a loss in each period, no matter what state the economy is in 
when the period starts. Within this particular framework it makes sense to look for 
“solutions” to the “problem” . To date, the search has not been easy. None of the 
proposed solutions has won unanimous support.
An influential idea has been the trigger-strategy equilibrium by Barro and Gor­
don (1983). In this setting a homogeneous private sector is assumed to adopt the 
strategy to believe that the government will stick to the time inconsistent behaviour
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until it has been found out that it did not do so on one single occasion. Once the 
government’s reputation is ruined in this way, the public will expect the government 
to behave in the time-consistent way in all periods. Thus a government facing a 
public that has adopted such a strategy will, depending on the magnitude of its 
discount factor, prefer to pick the time-inconsistent policy rather than deviate from 
it. Thus the time-consistency “problem” is “solved” .
It is easy to condemn this approach as oversimplistic. The most important 
problem is that the trigger strategy that this private sector is following is simply 
exogenous. In a model with no uncertainty, a strategy to assume no deviation 
from the time-inconsistent behaviour until such a deviation occurs seems reasonable 
enough. The verification of the government’s commitment is easy and imposes no 
costs. But as soon as the government’s grip on its policy targets is imperfect, 
there are immediate problems of state verification. A ll the private sector can do 
is to calculate an ex post probability of the government’s intent to deviate from 
the time-inconsistent solution. The problem becomes even more complicated when 
we assume that the public consists of decentralised agents. These may agree that 
a trigger strategy is the right thing to do in principle, but at what point they 
should assume that the government has been deviating deliberately from the time 
inconsistent behaviour? And if they think that the government did not stick to the 
rule it set out, for how long should the punishment period last? These issues seem 
to be very difficult to coordinate. No paper has found a compelling answers to these 
questions.
A  second approach towards solving the time-inconsistency problem is to set 
some social contractual obligations as proposed by Kotlikoff, Persson, and Svensson
(1988). This is a rather talmnndian idea that has sparked little interest. A  more 
seminal approach to the time-consistency problem in the monetary policy area has 
been the “Conservative Central Banker” , introduced by Rogoff (1985). The idea 
is to appoint somebody with preferences that are very inflation averse as the head 
of the central bank. The implementation details have given rise to a very large 
volume of literature, with some schemes developed that are rather complicated. I 
think it is best to remain silent about this branch of the literature since it is not 
of much interest to fiscal policy. A t least as far as J know, nobody has proposed 
a “conservative treasurer” . I would not blame lack o f imagination on the part of 
economists. There would be formidable obstacles to such an idea. The power to 
levy taxes is a traditional prerogative of parliaments, thus institutional reform would 
be hard. Second, the objectives of fiscal policy are much more complex than the 
ones of monetary policy, such that it is much more difficult to legislate rules for the 
“conservative treasurer” .
For fiscal policy issues, the most frequently studied problem has been the financ­
ing of an exogenous (possibly stochastic) sequence of government expenditures by 
distortionary taxation and debt issue. Lucas and Stokey (1983) have suggested that 
the time-inconsistency problem can be overcome if the government has a sufficiently 
large set of maturities at which it can issue debt. More precisely any government at 
the start date, (say government 1 ) of the economy can find a structure of debt issued
at different maturities such that, if subsequent governments (at time t >  1 ) honour 
the payments— interest and principal— of the debt contracted by the government 
at the start date 1 , their optimal choice under that repayment constraint will be 
to follow the optimal path chosen by government 1 . This is an elegant theoretical 
argument, but its practical implications are limited. First the model is derived in an 
economy that directly transforms labour into a consumable commodity without the 
need for capital. Second, under the stochastic version of the model the government 
would need to issue state-contingent debt i.e. debt claims that would give rise to 
claims only if a certain expenditure is realized. Third, besides the conventional prob­
lem of state verification, there is additional level of complication that would arise if 
expenditure levels were endogenous, possibly decided by the same agents that issued 
the contingent claims. Fourth, it is not clear why the subsequent government should 
be forced to execute the debt commitment. This point was taken up by Chari and 
Kehoe (1993) who allow for governments to default on the debt in the model of 
Lucas and Stokey (1983), without uncertainty. Clearly any government that faces 
a positive debt obligation would refuse to pay it. Therefore a plan that would in­
corporate some debt could not be supported. They show that earlier papers where 
positive debt was possible in equilibrium, like Calvo (1988) and Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) relied crucially on the assumption that there is a d i r e c t  cost to default other 
than the loss of reputation. The solution proposed by Lucas and Stokey (1983) 
relies on an infinite cost of default. Forcing governments not to default requires 
some external agent, say a constitutional court. Therefore it appears questionable 
why the constitutional court would not rather force the government at time t to 
execute the plans of government 1 , without the need to compute the complicated 
asset management strategy.
These limitations of the approach notwithstanding Persson, Persson, and Svens- 
son (1987) have extended the work by Lucas and Stokey (1983) to include monetary 
policy, but under the severely restrictive assumption that the money stock is the 
opposite of the discounted sum of government debt of all maturities. Therefore 
the initial stock is not predetermined. Thus the authors rule out any benefit from 
surprise inflation. They also do not consider the problem of optimal taxation o f a 
predetermined stock.
A  rare attempt to assess the time-consistency problem of fiscal policy empirically 
is Swadroop (1993). He builds a model with an infinitely-lived consumer endowed 
with one unit of leisure per period and a stock of government bonds at the end of 
her life. She has a constant returns-to-scaie production function of labour only at 
her disposal. Government spending is exogenous and stochastic. The government 
can use a distortionary tax on income or one-period government debt to finance 
expenditure. The author then computes the Euler conditions associated with a 
benevolent government and claims that these conditions hold for a time-consistent 
policy. Unfortunately, that is wrong. He recomputes the time-inconsistent solution 
in each period, which would imply the government surprising i t s e l f  each period by 
reoptimising. The decision in the first period must be taken in the knowledge that in 
the next period the government will solve the same problem again. Despite the fact
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that the model is not correctly set up, his empirical test are still of some interest since 
we can interpret it as testing for optimal (time inconsistent) fiscal policy. Using the 
General Methods of Moments technique (see Hansen and Singleton (1982)) on annual 
US data from 1937 to 1985 he can not reject the optimal taxation model. However 
it should be noted that the method is not really suited for testing a hypothesis.
2.2  Endogenous growth models with government infrastructure
The model in this thesis incorporates a private sector and a government. The gov­
ernment may spend on a publicly provided consumption good or on the building up 
of infrastructure that indirectly enters into the production function of firms. Arrow 
and Kurz (1970) have such a production function but do not study the occurance of 
endogenous growth. For permanent endogenous growth to occur, it suffices that in 
the steady state the government maintains the infrastructure as a constant fraction 
of GDP. Then the productivity of capital is bounded away from zero and perpetual 
growth is possible. This idea is pioneered by Barro (1990). He models a single­
commodity world where production is a function of a capital stock that does not 
depreciate and the h o w  of public services. There are three key results to his paper. 
The first is that the maximisation of welfare is equivalent to the maximisation of the 
growth rate. Second, the optimal constant tax rate for spending on investment is 
equal to the share of public investment in national output. And third, when public 
consumption (exogenous) is taken into account, it is optimal to levy an additional 
tax to pay for these services and the optimum investment in infrastructure will be 
unaffected.
These strong conclusions have invited further examination and qualification. 
Most of these additions have involved changing some of the mechanics of the Barro 
model. Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) modify a single aspect of the Barro 
model by modelling government capital as a stock rather than a flow. This con­
siderably improves the realism of the model at the expense of analytical simplicity. 
The result that growth is maximized when taxation is equal to public investment 
carries over from Barro to their model, as long as they abstract from government 
consumption. However welfare maximisation is no longer equal to growth maximi­
sation because we have transitory dynamics. The authors show that if the tax rate 
is constant, then the steady state is unique and that there is a unique stable path 
that converges to the steady state. In addition they demonstrate that the optimum 
tax rate is smaller than the one that maximizes growth, because growth maximi­
sation implies that future consumption streams are discounted at a rate 0  vis-a-vis 
current consumption. The analytical solutions o f the maximisation problem are not 
addressed because they are too complicated.
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) present analytical results in the case where both 
private and public depreciate fully during the period and preferences are logarithmic. 
Government consumption is absent, but- infrastructure spending may exhibit vary­
ing degrees of non-rivalry. Each individual firm produces with constant returns to 
scale capital and labour, but production is premultiplied by a term that depends on
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government spending divided by a Cobb-Douglas type index of private factor usage. 
Thus government consumption is a shift parameter in private production but the 
intensity of private factor usage will limit its impact i.e. public services are subject 
to a congestion effect. The authors then solve for the dynamic programme of the 
private sector and study the optimization problem the government. Unfortunately, 
the quite elegant formulation of congestion has no impact on the optimal growth 
rate, which is constant and differs from Barro (1990)’s by being premultiplied with 
the discount factor. The presence of the discount factor can be explained as follows. 
Barro restricts his policy to time-invariant taxation. In the initial period, capital is 
predetermined, but infrastructure is not since it is a flow. It is c u r r e n t  infrastructure 
that will affect current production. In that case, government spending is allocated 
to the sole objective of maximizing both current and future output. Glomm and 
Ravikumar however assume that current production depends on past investment. 
Therefore output in the first period is predetermined. Increasing taxes today there­
fore involves a sacrifice in current consumption and the solution becomes dependent 
on the discount factor. Maximizing welfare, in that scenario, is not equivalent to 
maximizing growth.
The problem of congestion is also taken up in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
They use a simple model of congestion where, in order to maintain the same aggre­
gate level of government services, the provision of these services has to rise with the 
level of GDP. They find that when there is no congestion, then lump-sum taxes are 
compatible with the social optimum, but in the presence of congestion, a propor­
tional tax on output may preserve the social optimum. Futagami and Mino (1995) 
investigate congestion in the presence of threshold externalities. In a simple formu­
lation they premultiply the Barro (1990) production function by a term that takes 
one value for up to a critical value of infrastructure, and a higher one beyond that 
threshold value of infrastructure. Alternatively they assume that that the multiply­
ing term is a logistic function of infrastructure. They find that the resulting paths, 
even for ad hoc constant tax policies will display multiple equilibria both for the 
long ran and along the trajectory. The realisation of any particular equilibrium is 
dependent on the private sector’s expectations.
Lau (1995) extends Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) to include government con­
sumption. Like theirs his model is in a permanent steady-growth state. Assuming 
that preferences are logarithmic, he can compute the optimal— from households’ 
preferences view— share of government spending on consumption and investment in 
GDP. It turns out that the government consumption is lower under welfare than un­
der growth maximisation, and that government consumption is higher. Therefore, 
assuming that governments are close to the welfare maximizing policy, an increase 
in government consumption should decrease growth, but an increase in government 
investment should increase growth, which is what Barro (1991) found in an empirical 
study. 1
A  paper in a similar vein is Lee (1992). His production per capita is a Cobb-
1See Hsieh and Lai (1994) and Lin (1994) for further references to the empirical literature.
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Douglas in the private capital stock per head and the aggregate public capital stock. 
Both stocks do not depreciate. He simultaneously studies government consumption, 
government investment and lump-sum transfers to private agents. He manages to 
solve for the optimum policy of the government when it acts as a leader over the 
private sector. He finds that there are two local optima, one with a slow growth 
rate, high government consumption and high transfers and distortionary taxes, and 
the other with low taxes, high government investment and low transfers. The con­
clusion that the government should finance positive lump-sum transfers in the first 
equilibrium using discretionary taxation appears odd. His results should be taken 
with caution. There appear computational mistakes in the displayed equations after 
his equation (10) and after his equation (13).
The effect of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model has also been examined 
by Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). The basic production framework is the same as 
Glomm and Ravikumar’s, but no specific functional form is assumed. An additional 
level of generality is added by assuming that labour supply is elastic. The gov­
ernment finances consumption and infrastructure expenditure through lump-sum 
taxation. The authors are interested in the effects of permanent and temporary 
changes in fiscal policy. First, when there is an increase in government consumption 
spending, the increase in taxation needed to finance it will reduce private sector 
income and consumption. The marginal utility of income increases, therefore house­
holds will increase their labour supply. The increase in labour supply raises the 
productivity of capital and results in additional capital accumulation, potentially 
leading to a rise in the growth rate. In addition to the effect of taxation, there is a 
direct effect— through the representative agent’s felicity— of government consump­
tion on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. This 
effect could potentially reverse the adverse effect of taxation on the representative 
consumer’s utility. Increased expenditure on infrastructure will have the same tax­
ation effect since it also needs to be financed by tax. In addition, an increase in 
public infrastructure results in an increase in income that will tend to counter the 
taxation effect. The total impact of increasing infrastructure on the private cap­
ital stock is therefore ambiguous. The authors then show that when technology 
is Cobb-Douglas, an increase in government consumption will increase the private 
capital stock by more than an increase in public infrastructure would. However the 
welfare effect and growth effects of raising one or the other are ambiguous.
The interaction between public expenditure and labour supply decisions are also 
taken up by Devereux and Love (1995). They show that government spending can 
have an impact on growth even in the absence of direct government investment 
into the capital stock. Their model comprises physical capital and human capital. 
Labour supply is elastic, and human capital accumulation is not taxed. When a 
permanent increase in government spending occurs, its effect will depend on how 
the increase is financed. When the government uses a lump-sum tax, the private 
sector wealth is reduced. Both leisure and consumption are normal goods; therefore 
there will be a drop in private consumption and an increase in the labour supply. 
In equilibrium, the rate of return on accumulating human capital increases, and so
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does the rate of return on physical capital. Therefore the growth rate will rise. This 
result, which is very close to Turnovsky and Fisher hinges on the lump-sum taxation 
assumption. When the lump-sum tax is replaced by an income tax, Devereux and 
Love show that a permanent increase in taxation will reduce growth via a reduction 
in the private capital stock.
A  comprehensive recent study of fiscal policy with optimising government spend­
ing is the “Model 3” of Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993). Contrary to Turnovsky 
and Fisher (1995), they study distortionary taxation. There is also an interesting 
variation on the stock/flow specification of the productive input, where the invest­
ment is homogeneous function of degree one in private and public gross fixed capital 
investment2. In addition, there is an important feature that is absent in the previ­
ous contributions: the government’s budget constraint is relaxed to its intertemporal 
version, i.e. the government may accumulate debt or assets. The government would 
like to use lump-sum taxation, and even if there is no lump-sum taxation is avail­
able, the government can tax the current capital stock. Since this capital stock is 
predetermined, taxing it mimics a lump-sum tax. Therefore the optimum solution 
consists in taxing the existing capital stock heavily in the first periods, until a sur­
plus is built up that allows to finance future commitments without the necessity to 
levy further distortionary taxes. There are two problems with that solution. The 
first is that the authors need to impose a restriction on the tax rate to prevent it 
to hit over 100%. The computed trajectory then depends heavily on the restriction 
that is adopted, in fact when control is implemented, the tax rate jumps to the 
bound and remains there for many periods. Therefore the bound drives the solu­
tion. The second problem is that that solution is not time-consistent. A t any point 
in the future, as long as there is revenue to raise, there remains the temptation to 
raise taxes again. The authors acknowledge that “This is clearly a problem with the 
solutions presented in connection with these models” (p. 511) and that “ . . .  a more 
complete treatment of the problem including these issues would be of considerable 
interest” (p. 487).
This issue is addressed by Krichel and Levine (1995). Here the authors build 
a model with overlapping generations a la Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985). There 
are two groups of consumers. The first group maximises a discounted sum of loga­
rithmic felicity from consumption of a private and a publicly provided consumption 
commodities. The second group are liquidity constrained and spend the current 
income on the private consumption commodity. The production side of the model 
is similar to Barro (1990), but both private capital and infrastructure are modelled 
as stocks. This precludes an analytical solution of the off-steady-state behaviour. 
The government can finance expenditure by levying a distortionary income tax or 
through issuing debt. To simplify the problem the simulation exercise leaves total 
government consumption and infrastructure (as fractions of GD P) at some exoge­
nous calibrated value. The only decision is the financing of the expenditure. This 
decision would be irrelevant if agents were immortal, there would be no population
2A CES specification is chosen for the simulations. “Model 3” does not have a labour/leisure 
choice but this aspect is addressed in other models of the paper.
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growth and taxes would be lump-sum. Nevertheless with these features present, the 
financing decision implies changes in the long run rate of growth.
In Krichel and Levine (1996) the authors refine that work. On the modeling 
side, they introduce adjustment costs arising from changes in the private and public 
capital stock. The main motivation is here that it allows for an additional time- 
inconsistency effect. It turns out that any realistic calibration of the finite life and 
population growth aspect has hardly any impact on the steady-state interest rate 
and growth rates. The assumption of adjustment costs makes the model altogether 
more inelastic, i.e. policy has a smaller impact on the economy. In the simulation 
exercises, all the government is allowed to do is to vary taxes and the fraction of 
government expenditure spent on infrastructure.
As far as the difference between time consistent and optimal policy is concerned, 
both Krichel and Levine (1995) and Krichel and Levine (1996) reach the same con­
clusion. Although the time-consistent equilibrium is sub-optimal in terms of steady- 
state welfare, it yields h ig h e r  growth, through an accumulation of assets by the state 
and a cut of government consumption.
In an interesting paper, Benhabib and Velasco (1996) examine the issue of op­
timal and time-consistent taxation. They study an infinitely-lived consumer in a 
small open economy with perfect capital mobility. This simplifies the analysis a 
great deal by removing the dynamics of the post-tax interest rate, since taxation 
is source based. They generalise the Barro (1990) production function by using a 
CES rather than Cobb-Douglas. In the first period is is optimal to set the tax rate 
to some optimising value say f (0 )  for a given capital stock. In the next period, 
the government sets the tax rate to another value say f , that takes into account 
that the imposition of tax will distort the supply of capital. In the Barro model, 
t (0 ) —  f  such that the economy would always be in a balanced growth path. But 
with the CES production function, the two solutions are not the same. The time- 
inconsistent solution is r (0 ) for the first period, and some other r  for all others. In 
the time-consistent solution, the first tax rate r ( 0 ) will always prevail in any period, 
because of the reoptimisation imposed to treat the current capital as given. The 
time-consistent path will maximise national output and hence growth in every pe­
riod, but the time inconsistent path will lead to higher welfare, not because there is 
government consumption spending like in many other contributions in this strand of 
the literature but because the production function is not of a substitution elasticity 
of 1. In fact if  the elasticity is larger that 1 , we have f (0 )  >  f  and vice versa. In this 
model, the time-consistent policy is welfare reducing for all parameter choices. The 
authors investigate the best sustainable rule using the trigger strategy concept. A ll 
the results of this paper are dependent on output depending on the flow of public 
investment, rather than the stock of capital. Otherwise with constant returns to 
scale, the current production depends on decisions taken in the previous period, the 
problem becomes genuinely dynamic and, alas, difficult to solve.
There is a whole strand of the literature that models the impact of the govern­
ment’s action on the economy’s growth rate in a more indirect way. These studies 
assume that there is a private externality through which the productivity of capital
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remains bounded away from zero. These studies usually use the concept of human 
capital to introduce this externality. The government’s policy can has a more in­
direct influence on the economy. Recent papers in that strand include Liu (1994), 
Ni and Wang (1994), Tran-Nam, Truong, and Ninh Van Tu (1995), Wang and Y ip  
(1995), Greiner (1996), Martin and Rogers (1997) and Ihori (1997) for the closed 
economy and Osang and Pereira (1996) for a small open economy. It would be too 
long (and too boring) to review this strand of the literature here.
2.3 Differential growth in open economies
In Subsection 4.2 and Section 6  thesis I am particularly interested in the occurance of 
differential growth. The main question I address (and actually solve) is the existence 
of equilibria with differential growth. In other words: is it possible for one economy 
to grow faster than another permanently? Growth differentials are neglected in the 
current open economy macroeconomics literature. There are three reasons for that.
First the traditional open economy macroeconomics model is based on the basic 
Mundell-Fleming framework. It is not suited to the introduction o f growth differ­
entials, because growth only plays a limited role in the model. To take a recent 
example, van Tuijl, de Groof, and Koolnaar (1997) have a model that only uses 
exogenous technical progress to investigate spillovers of public capital and fiscal pol­
icy. Their model can address the impact of one economy’s fiscal policy on the other 
along an exogenously given long-run growth path. This is technically introduced 
as by considering the deviation of each variable from the steady-state growth path 
using a linear model throughout. This long run exogenous nature of growth is not 
limited to this type of linear models. It is generic to most models that do not have 
explicit microfoundations.
Second, within the more microfoundation-based Swan (1956)-Solow (1956) frame­
work of exogenous growth, the long run growth rate of GDP per capita is zero as 
long as there is no exogenous rate of technical progress. W ith a common technol­
ogy, the question of diverging growth rates does not appear. I f  all countries have 
the same production function, and if preferences are identical3 then countries will 
converge to the same level of GDP per capita. A  recent paper that continues this ex­
ogenous growth approach is Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Production 
is a Cobb-Douglas with human capital, physical capital and raw labour as inputs. A  
small economy jumps to the steady state once opened to a world where interest rates 
are constant and capital mobility is perfect. To remove that feature, the authors 
introduce imperfect capital mobility in the sense that only physical capital can serve 
as a collateral for international borrowing and concentrate on the case where this 
constraint is binding when the economy is opened up to the international capital 
market. In that case only physical capital jumps to its steady state, human capital 
still takes time to adjust. This credit-constraint open economy then converges to a 
steady state in much the same way as a closed economy would do.
3There is no obvious reason why at the level of aggregation required for macroeconomic analysis 
tastes should not be the same.
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Clearly the emphasis of macroeconomic theory on models in which the long run 
rate of growth is equal across countries contrast with the received wisdom of large—  
maybe growing— income disparities in the world4. W ith the advent of the “endoge­
nous growth literature” , the potential for diverging growth rates within models using 
optimizing agents has appeared. An important obstacle is the assumption of capital 
mobility. W ith perfect capital mobility, the equalisation of interest rate will imply 
that the marginal productivity of capital is is the same in all countries even in the 
short run. In many models, including endogenous growth models, this implies the 
equality of income in the long run, where factors are mobile. This is well illustrated 
on a textbook level by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
One of the first two-country endogenous growth models was Alogoskoufis and 
van der Ploeg (1991). They build a two-country model with perfect capital mo­
bility and cross-country externalities of the capital stocks. Both countries produce 
an identical commodity. Capital provides for an externality on labour productivity, 
both domestically and internationally such that output can be written as a function 
of the domestic and foreign capital stock only. Since both are reproducible factors 
long-run growth will be possible. W ith perfect capital mobility, there will be equal­
ization of growth rates in each period. This follows from the assumption that the 
technology is identical and from the assumption that all production factors can be 
traded. Note however that the authors allow for a difference in the scale parameter 
of the production function, therefore the model does not have level convergence. 
Growth rates remain common from an initial level of income that may be different, 
and incomes involve in parallel.
One important strand of the endogenous growth literature that has been used 
for multi-country work was pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1992) which in 
turn is based on Romer (1989). In these models the growth process is modelled as 
the expansion of product varieties. There is no physical capital as such, production 
is a function of labour and knowledge. Knowledge capital is created as a by-product 
of R&D activity. By a convenient choice of units, the total capital stock can be 
considered as the sum of varieties produced in each country. Recent examples of this 
approach are Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Devereux and Lapham (1994), Currie, 
Levine, Pearlman, and Chui (1998) and Walde (1996). A ll rely on an identical 
utility function in both countries in the form of a discounted logarithmic felicity 
in a composite commodity. W ith this specific functional form, the interest rate in 
each instant is pinned down by the discount rate. Walde (1996) studies the case 
of initially differing capital stocks, i.e. one country producing more varieties when 
both economies are closed. When the economies open, both will converge to a 
common growth rate since the stock of knowledge spreads to both countries. The 
rate of innovation in the long run depends on the total stock of knowledge capital. 
However in the country where innovation was slow, the rate initially overshoots, 
i.e. rises beyond the common long run rate and approaches it from above. Note 
that the common long run rate of growth is the result of international spillover of
4I will not attempt to summarize the large a empirical literature on the question of convergence.
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knowledge capital. Devereux and Lapham (1994) had shown before that if there was 
no international spillover of knowledge, then the opening of economies will result in 
two countries with diverging size, as soon as the the initial knowledge stocks are 
not identical. In the limit one economy will do all the R&D and the other will 
do none, its production will be of size zero in the world economy, despite perfect 
capital mobility. This model is an early example for a model that has diverging 
growth rates.
Another strand in the literature that does allow for persistent growth differen­
tials is Buiter and Kletzer (1991), Buiter and Kletzer (1993) and Buiter and Kletzer 
(1995). They have models that generate persistent growth differentials despite per­
fect capital mobility. The basic idea is that there is a source of growth that must 
be home-grown, i.e. cannot be imported. In their examples this home-grown input 
is human capital. A ll three papers are based on a three-period overlapping gener­
ations model that allows for proper modeling both of the process of accumulation 
of human capital within a generation as well as the transmission of human capital 
between generations. The three papers develop variations of the human capital ac­
cumulation process and the authors take great care to model this in precise details. 
One important message of these papers however is that if production involves a 
non-traded input, and if endogenous growth occurs, then there can be differences in 
labour productivity. Note that difference in labour productivity also implies steady- 
state divergence in the growth rate. This on the other hand implies that in the 
steady state, one country has an infinite size vs. the other. None of the papers for­
mally addresses that issue. A ll calculations examine the short-run effects of policies 
that depart from an initial symmetric equilibrium. Thus it is not clear what impact 
differential growth rates have on the accumulation of assets in the longer run.
Is a growth-run growth differential possible? To simplify, identify “long run” with 
perpetual, and think of two-country framework. An intuitive first argument is that 
such a situation is not possible. I f two economies grow at different rates, perpetually, 
then the slower growing economy will have a size zero in the long run, therefore we 
are implicitly studying a closed economy. This simple argument is probably the 
main reason why the academic literature has not addressed the possibility of long 
run growth differentials. I will refer to this idea as the “size argument” .
One possible avenue for overcoming the above argument is to refine the notion 
of “size” . I f  the size of an economy is total GDP, then there is a possibility that 
total GDP growth is uneven but compensated by a differential in the population 
growth rate. Razin and Yuen (1996a) and Razin and Yuen (1996b) use endoge­
nous population growth to overcome this version of the size problem. However the 
problem with endogenous fertility is that over time the “world” population will only 
be in one country, the other will have relative population of zero and studying its 
characteristics will not be relevant. 5
To summarise this literature, I conjecture that growth rate differentials do not 
appear in models where there is a direct spillover effect in factor productivity, for
5More on the economics of divergent population growth can be found in an interesting paper 
by Deardorff (1994).
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example where there is diffusion of knowledge or where the capital stock in one 
country has an impact on the productivity of factors abroad. My conjecture would 
be that is is possible to have divergent growth as soon as there is one single home­
grown production factor that can not be imported and the productivity of which is 
independent of factors abroad. In all existing models of differential growth, the long 
run is characterized by the slow growing country being of size zero.
In Subsection 4.2 I argue that long run growth differential can be sustained 
without any problems of either physical economy size or foreign asset accumula­
tion. The key to this result is to consider a world where each country specializes 
in the production of its own good. In that case, the difference in GDP growth 
can be “compensated” by a change in the terms of trade. I show conditions under 
which a balanced growth path with differential growth exists and derive some of its 
properties.
2.4 The literature on debt and the de Silhouette problem
In this section, I am interested in the issue of financing a given stream of expenditure 
through either taxation or debt. There are situations in which this problem does not 
matter. This requires that the public sector is infinitely lived or that it is composed 
by overlapping generations linked by bequests. It also requires that taxes are not 
distortionary, i.e. typically lump-sum. Here I will be looking at any model where one 
of these conditions does not hold and this so-called “Ricardian equivalence” fails. 
In this case the choice between tax and debt financing does matter.
Probably the most famous contribution on the effects of public debt is Diamond 
(1965). He combines a neo-classical production function with an overlapping gener­
ations model to examine one of the reasons why Ricardian equivalence breaks down, 
the fact that consumers have finite lives and are not linked through bequests. To 
simplify matters, taxes are lump-sum. Diamond (1965) considers the situation where 
the debt per head is raise in period one, and then held constant at that higher level. 
The first generation will benefit from an increase in debt because with unchanged 
government spending the rise in debt means a decrease in taxation. For the next 
generation the increase in taxes caused by the increase in debt makes for a fall in 
welfare, but the interest-rate rise that one can expect (under some regularity con­
dition) will introduce a price effect that may increase utility, thus the overall effect 
is ambiguous. However in the steady state, welfare will be lower for all generations, 
as long as the interest rate is larger than the growth rate.
What Diamond did not consider is the normative problem of a government max­
imising welfare. From the discussion of the impact of an exogenous increase in debt, 
it is clear that if the government does not discard the future very heavily it will 
decrease debt. In fact it can be shown that at around the point where debt is zero, a 
further reduction still improves welfare in the longer run, as long as the economy is 
dynamically efficient6. We can therefore conclude that fiscal policy should be viewed 
as an instrument to bring the economy towards the golden rule. I f  the economy is
6See Krichel (1997) for further details.
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initially efficient, bringing the economy closer to the golden rule will imply that the 
government raises a stock of assets. It may not do this to the full extent as to bring 
the interest rate to the level of the growth rate because it discounts future benefits 
vs. current costs but in general we should expect it to bring both rates closer to­
gether by holding negative debt. Note this conclusion based on Diamond (1965) is 
independent of the idea that taxation is directly costly, because in his model tax­
ation is lump-sum. It is also worth pointing out that although his conclusions are 
drawn for an ad hoc overall fiscal policy that stabilises debt after the first period, 
the conclusion should be robust for a wide variety of fiscal policies.
Another strand of the literature can be described as the tax-smoothing litera­
ture, and started with Barro (1979). His departure from the Ricardian equivalence 
results from assuming that taxation is distortionary. He seeks the optimal fiscal 
policy and finds that the intertemporal marginal tax distortions must be equalised 
through all periods. Roughly speaking that means that that debt should rise when 
the economy is hit by an adverse shock and decline when there is a favourable shock 
to the economy. The underlying reason for that comes straight out of concavity 
assumptions over the private sector’s lifetime utility. Overall in the long run, debt 
should be zero. Manldw (1987) extended this literature to the collection of seignior­
age. However the power of his model is limited because he assumes constant velocity 
of circulation. Another important paper in this strand— it extends the idea of debt 
smoothing to a stochastic world— is Lucas and Stokey (1983) that I have already 
discussed in Subsection 2 . 1  on page 8 . Their title alludes to an important limita­
tion of this literature, the fact that it does not include the presence of a taxable 
stock. I f  there is a stock that can be taxed, then the nature of the problem changes 
completely. A t any period f, the stock at the beginning of the period was formed 
in period t — 1 , therefore taxing it in period t does not imply any distortion. Hence 
the optimal way to tax a stock over time is to levy a heavy tax on the stock in the 
beginning. At unchanged expenditure, the government will reduce debt to accumu­
late assets. This policy will avoid the levying of taxes in the future. This is welfare 
improving because taxes on stocks yet to be formed are distortionary. In a rational 
expectations equilibrium, they discourage the formation of the stock in the current 
period.
An early formal account of this idea is Chamley (1986). He used an infinitely 
lived household accumulating capital for a neoclassical production technology. He 
shows that under fairly general conditions, the optimal tax on capital is zero in the 
long run. Government expenditure is financed through assets accumulated in earlier 
periods.
Note that this profile of taxation is not limited to the taxation of capital but 
generic to the taxation of any stock. A  telling example is Obstfeld (1991). He is in­
terested in seigniorage collection, but rather than assuming that the velocity remains 
constant, he stipulates a general function where the stock of money demanded de­
pends negatively on the expected rate of inflation. He searches for a time-consistent 
equilibrium and shows— under very general conditions— that this implies that the 
government in the long run finances the expenditure stream by a stock of assets that
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Let us take stock of those results. We have two departures from Ricardian 
equivalence. One is that lives are finite, the other is that taxes are distortionary. 
As long as the former problem occurs in an economy that is dynamically efficient, 
and as soon as the latter includes the option to tax a stock, both departures from 
Ricardian equivalence point to the same pattern of taxes and debt over time. This 
is an initial outburst of taxation leading to an accumulation of assets that finance 
the expenditure in future periods.
Note that this trajectory of fiscal policy does not directly rely on an assumption 
of the presence or absence of time consistency as it is sometimes alleged . 7  I f  the 
trajectory is time consistent, reoptimisation in every period is likely to lead to an 
increase in assets in every period as long as there are taxation requirements in the 
future8. In the case of a precommitment solution, this is not necessarily the case 
because the taxation cost in the future is discounted heavily vs. the cost of current 
tax increases, therefore in general under a precommitment regime, we would expect 
that the asset position worsens in the long run, though not necessary as much as to 
give positive debt.
It is useful to label the whole class of policies that are characterized by an initial 
sharp rise in taxation and accumulation of assets as a “de Silhouette” policy. I 
invented this term to honour Etienne de Silhouette9, a former French finance minister 
who strongly believed in the optimality of this type of policy. His term of office as 
“controleur des finances” in 1756 was very brief indeed. He lost favour with the 
aristocracy when he planned to raise a tax on land.
Turnovsky (1996) provides an alternative interpretation of de Silhouette poli­
cies. His focus is a production function similar to Barro (1990), in particular the 
model is in the balanced growth path at any point in time. He also introduces 
congestion effects in both public consumption and investment. His focus is the com­
parison between the allocation achieved by a central planner and the decentralised 
equilibrium. He limits attention to either government consumption or government 
investment, i.e. each appears separately. Debt is only considered in the case where 
the government expenditure has no productive role. I f  a consumption tax can be 
levied, then the optimum can be implemented in the decentralised economy. I f  there 
is no consumption tax, then the optimum can only be implemented if  the govern­
ment is initially a creditor to the economy. Thus we can understand a de Silhouette 
policy as a means to direct a decentralised economy onto the optimum path.
Sadly, the de Silhouette theory of fiscal policy contrasts sharply with the what 
happens in the “Real World” . Therefore the profession does tend to “lowlight” 
these results. For example, in a recent broad survey of fiscal policy Tanzi and Zee 
(1997) do not mention this issue at all. I think that it is important to think of 
the implications for practical policy of the welfare loss incurred through public debt.
7For an example see van der Ploeg (1995), page 439.
8This is in fact the case considered in Obstfeld (1991).
9Conventionally we think of a silhouette as an outline shade. In fact these drawings are named 
after him. They became fashionable in his time to ridicule the man and his policies.
it has accumulated in the previous periods.
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cooperation non-cooperation
not time-consistent SP f ^ T P
time-consistent S T ^ T C T N
Table 2.1: Overview of the regimes
Further work on simple calibrated models could give a rough estimate for the welfare 
loss.
2.5 The model of Devereux and Mansoorian
From a technical point of view, the work of this thesis is based on Devereux and 
Mansoorian (1992). This is a straightforward generalisation of Barro (1990) to a 
two-country world where each country is fully specialised in the production of a 
single traded commodity. National production is a function of the domestic capital 
stock and the domestic infrastructure stock. This makes for a non-traded factor 
without spillover effect, therefore uneven growth is possible. Households wish to 
consume commodities from both countries at fixed budget shares. There is complete 
depreciation of both capital stocks. Symmetry between policymakers implies the 
same policies are pursued in each country. Policy choices are static. Therefore the 
economies are always in a balanced steady state. In a Nash equilibrium countries 
choose their taxes and spending rates independently from each other to maximise 
domestic welfare. In the cooperative optimum a central planner maximises the 
sum of the welfare of domestic and foreign welfare. The first result of the paper, 
their proposition 1 , is that the choice of government investment is not subject to a 
coordination problem. In other words, the spending on government infrastructure 
is identical under Nash and cooperative regimes, and identical to the one in Barro
(1990), discussed on page 69 below. When government consumption is taken account 
of the results depends crucially in the elasticity of substitution in the felicity function. 
W ith logarithmic felicity, an analytical solution is possible and it can be shown that 
cooperative equilibrium involves a decline in public consumption and an increase 
in growth. This result carries through for a “high” (i.e. larger than 1 ) elasticity of 
substitution. But if the elasticity is low, then this result may reverse. In that case 
cooperation involves slower growth and higher taxes than the Nash equilibrium. The 
received wisdom is that the elasticity is about .5, in which case the ambiguity is very 
important. When the elasticity is .4 the two regimes are virtually identical.
The emphasis of Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) is on optimal policies in a 
model that is simple enough to allow for such policies to be computed. For simplicity 
they look at a totally symmetric world. In that case both countries will follow the 
same policy. In this thesis my first interest are asymmetric policies. What happens if 
the two governments set taxes rates that are not the same? Then surely one economy 
will grow at a different rate than the other. Is there an equilibrium? W ill such an 
equilibrium be reached if one government decides to change is taxes, departing from 
an initially symmetric equilibrium?
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The model of Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) is always on a balanced growth 
path. This thesis sets out a model that is more general. Most importantly, I allow 
for incomplete depreciation of capital. This makes for a genuinely d y n a m ic  model. 
In such a setting the problem of time inconsistency arises and it is related to the 
issue of policy coordination. It is easiest to consider the two issues separately. A  
summary of the regimes is given in Table 2.5. To carefully isolate the issue of opti­
mal vs time-consistent policy I explicitly construct a single-country model and use 
simulations for that model to investigate that issue in Section 7. There I distinguish 
a Single country Precommitment regime SP and a Single country Time-consistent 
regime ST. The single country simulations are the same than those obtained for the 
two-country cooperative regime, where they are named T P  (Two-country Precom­
mitment) andTC  (Two-country Cooperative). The Non-cooperative time-consistent 
regime is called TN. Regimes TN , TC  and T P  are all discussed in Section 8 , but the 
emphasis is on the comparison between TC  and TN.
A  generalisation of models of the type of Barro (1990) for one country and 
Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) for two countries is an obvious choice for the 
topics of the thesis because
• in these models the private sector and the public sector are both treated as 
infinitely lived agents, which makes the treatment logically more transparent;
• both the private and the public sector have the same problem to solve, essen­
tially a repeated consumption/savings problem;
• the simultaneous presence o f public consumption and an infrastructure stock 
as a crucial input in production makes for an important role of fiscal policy 
both in the short run and the long run. This relationship is exactly what we 
need to focus on for the study of time consistency;
• since in each country there is a capital input that must be home-grown i.e., 
that can not be imported, there is an opportunity to study growth differentials;
• the models are based on very standard formulations of utility and production 
and they are therefore not likely to lead to technical difficulties that would 
distract from the essential message conveyed by the model.
Therefore I am introducing such a model in the next section.
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3 T h e  M o d e l
The model is a generalisation of the model of Devereux and Mansoorian (1992).
I add three features. First the shares of consumption of the domestic and foreign 
commodity in utility do not need to be 1 /2 . Second and most importantly, I allow for 
incomplete depreciation of stocks at rate 6 . This feature makes the model d y n a m ic .  
Last, I model infrastructure as a stock rather than a flow. In Subsection 3.1 I deal 
with the demand side of the model. The microfoundations of the demand side are 
very important for the model. The forward-looking nature of consumption causes 
time-inconsistency of policy that will be studied in more detail later. To allow for 
a more transparent treatment of this issue, time is discrete, and points in time are 
denoted t. Period t stretches between date t — 1 and t. This implies that stocks are 
noted as end-of-period magnitudes.
3.1 Consumption of infinitely lived household
Let there be two economies called Home and Foreign. Both are specialised in the 
production of a traded commodity called the “home commodity” and the “foreign 
commodity” , respectively. Both commodities are used for consumption both at 
home and abroad; the domestic commodity is also used for capital accumulation 
in its respective country. Let C d  be the consumption of the home commodity at 
Home, and C f the consumption of the foreign commodity at Home. Let there be a 
single infinitely-lived representative consumer in both the domestic and the foreign 
economy. Both have the same type of utility function. For the domestic economy 
we have
oo
U ( t )  —  u ( C d ( t  +  D? C f(t+  f-0? (7c(t + t ' ) )  (3.1)
t ' = 0
where felicity takes the isoelastic form
„ h , ( q w  (3 ,2 )
As is standard is this type of literature, (3.1) implicitly assumes additive separability 
o f the utility in different periods. Utility U  is a discounted sum of the felicity u  
derived from consumption in different periods. 0  <  g  <  1  is the discount factor. 
When convenient for the clarity of exposition, I also use the discount rate a defined 
by 1 / ( 1  + a).
The isoelastic nature of the felicity function in (3.2) is also a standard feature; 
the elasticity of substitution is given by 1 / a . 77 is a parameter that indicates the 
importance of publicly provided consumption commodity G c. As noted by Devereux 
and Mansoorian the assumption that utility from consumption in different periods 
can be additively separated is important for the model. It ensures analytical sim­
plicity and prevents the government from manipulating consumers’ intertemporal 
elasticities through changes in fiscal policy. I follow Barro (1990) and Devereux and 
Mansoorian (1992) by assuming that the publicly provided commodity is not subject
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to a congestion effect. According to authors who have explicitly introduced conges­
tion effect— Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) or Turnovsky (1996)— this implies that 
usage of the commodity by one consumer does not impede on the usage by another 
person, i.e., that the commodity would be non-rival. However compelling this argu­
ment may be, it fails to convince in this model where the private sector is already 
modelled as one unit. Its size remains at unity in every period.
The budget identity o f a consumer at date t is:
F (t )  C d ( t) +  P \ t )  C'f(t) +  P (t )  J I (t) +  P ( t )  K ( t)
=  P ( t) Y (t )  +  P (t )  J l ( t  -  1) (1 +  r (t  -  1 )) +  ( 1  -  6 ) P ( t  — 1 ) K ( t  -  1)
Here J l is international lending by the Home consumer, expressed in units of the 
Home commodity and K  is Home capital in units of the domestic commodity. P  
and P *  are the prices of Home and Foreign commodity respectively. The last term 
would disappear in Devereux and Mansoorian’s model since they implicitly assume 
6 —  1 . I use the relative price as
Home non-human wealth n f ( l )  is expressed in terms of the Home commodity as
U f ( t ) = K ( i )  +  J l ( i )  (3.3)
and Home consumption expenditure is defined as
C (t) =  Cd(t )+ p ( t )C f ( t )  (3.4)
in terms of the Home commodity. Using these conventions, we can write the budget 
identity for the domestic economy as
C ( t) +  J I{t) +  K ( t )  =  Y (t )  +  (1 +  r (t  -  1)) J I (t -  1) +  (1 -  5 ) K ( t  -  1) (3.5)
In this model, firms, not households are taxed. Households receive a disposable 
income Y  from firms that has been taxed:
Y { 1 )  =  Q (t) ( 1  -  r ( t ) )
Here Q  is domestic output. Income could be split into income from labour and 
capital, both being taxed at the same level as in
Y (t )  - 6 K (t -  1) =  w ( t) L { t )  +  r (t  -  1) K { t  -  1) (3.6)
where L  is labour (considered a flow here) and Q  is output. In factor market 
equilibrium w  (the post-tax wage) will be equal to the post-tax marginal product of 
labour (including externalities) and 5 +  r, where r  is the post-tax interest rate, will 
be equal to the private marginal productivity of capital as expected in period t — 1 . 
Using (3.6) and (3.3) in (3.5) gives the budget identity
C ( t )  +  n f { t) =  w ( i )  L { t) +  ( 1  +  r (t -  1 ) )  I l f (t -  1 ) (3.7)
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I now need to define the interest rate between period t and t '.
I f  the usual limiting condition holds
mXt' +  1 ) n
lim  --------- T—r  =  0
i ' - j-o o  l  +  r i _ i ( t )
we can forward (3.7) into the future to get
Here I K  is total wealth, the sum of non-human (or asset) wealth and human wealth
U l ( t  -  1) =  i f  (t -  1) +  JI{1  -  1) +  I l f f t  -  1 ) (3.9)
where I l f f i  — 1 ) is human wealth at the beginning of t, i.e. the present value of 
current and future wage earnings
^ - D  =  E r ( 3 . i o )
The consumer’s problem is to maximise (3.1) under the constraint (3.8), with which
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we associate the multiplier X(t). The first order conditions1 0  imply
C (t ') =  1  Cd(t') =  — Cf(t') V t' >  t (3.17)
a  1 — a
and
a e )  ( c a )  (1 + * )w  r r l
( ) " U t ' ) J  ( )  ( 1  +  r,(t' -  1 ) ) - / '  (3-18)
Equation (3.17) implies that the budget shares of both commodities are constant, a
well known property of Cobb-Donglas felicity. Equation (3.18) gives the evolution
of total consumption as a function of initial consumption. I f  t '  =  t, (3.18) becomes 
an identity. I f  cr =  1, the first term becomes a constant and any relative price 
price change will not impact on the time profile of consumption. I f  the degree 
of intertemporal substitution is high— a  <  1 , then as the terms of trade improve, 
the consumption profile tilts downwards and current consumption rises. In the 
conventional case where the degree of intertemporal substitution is low i.e., a  >  
1 , then as the terms of trade improve, the consumption profile tilts upwards and 
current consumption falls. Even the terms of trade remain constant, the elasticity 
of substitution is still important because it determines how sensitive consumption is 
to changes in the interest rate and the discount rate. To pin down the current level
10 For any period t' we have
t/ du  _  X(t)
and in the next period
8 acd(t') l  +  r i _ i ( t '- l )  (3-u )
t'+i d u X(t) /,
8 SCdft' + l) lH -n-i(t') ( '
These equations also hold for the foreign good
(3.13)
Using the specifics of the felicity function
du 
dCi
Using (3.14) in (3.11) and (3.12) we get
d C d d f
  f i ^  (i~er) r*0 -~a) (1—<»■)—1
C f ~ { 1 ~ a ) ° d Gf
(3.14)
( C d( t '  +  1 )\
a (1 —<r) — 1
1 1
( C f ( t '  +  m (l-a) (l-o-) ^
V <Jd(t') J I  C i ( f )  J ”  1  + r(f7)
(3.15)
/ i i - r \ x j
Using (3.14) in (3.11) and (3.13) and dividing, we find
p(i') aCf(t ')  =  (1 — a) Cd(tr) (3.16)
using (3.4) in (3.16) and using (3.16) and (3.4) in (3.15) we get (3.17) and (3.18)
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of consumption, I need to substitute the sequence (3.18) in the budget constraint
(3.8). This leads to
  ( 3 ' 1 9 )
where I have introduced the expression
(l-<7) O-tt)
i , c ( t ) =  ( i  +  ^ )(t t)/a , v
f e U t ' ) /  ( i  +  n ( t ' -  1 ) ) 1 - V "  (3-20)
to shorten notation. Changes in this term are crucial for the dynamics of the model, 
and in particular to the distinction of the closed and open economy. I call f  the “re­
luctance rate” . The larger the reluctance rate, the smaller is the rise in consumption 
that follows an increase in wealth. The evolution of £(t) is given by
(1 — O’) (1 —o)
_  (  ? (*) A * i  +  g ( t + 1 )
\ p ( t + l ) J  ( 1  +  r ( t ) )1-1/<T ( 1  +  a) 1 / C7
I f  cf =  1  there is no impact of relative prices on the reluctance to consume. When 
cr >  1  then if the domestic terms of trade improve, there will be an increase in the 
reluctance to consume. In the less conventional case where a  <  1 an improvement 
in the term of trade decreases the reluctance rate and results in higher consumption. 
This completes the demand side of the model.
3.2 Other aspects of the model
I depart from a standard neoclassical production function where output is written as 
a constant returns to scale production function in accumulated capital and labour. 
For simplicity, I adopt the Cobb-Douglas formulation
Q (t) =  € K (t l ) K (e(t) T ( t ) )1-K (3.22)
where k , is capital’s share in output, and e is the efficiency of raw labour. Following 
Krichel and Levine (1996), I assume in turn that the efficiency of labour depends on 
the ratio of an aggregate index of capital per labour
t ( t ) - g ( i - i ) ^ ( t - i ) W  (323)
where K s is a stock of infrastructure provided by the government. Substitute (3.23) 
into ( 3 .2 2 ) to get
Q (t) =  e K { t -  l ) 7  K g ( t — I ) 1 " 7  (3.24)
for an appropriate 7 . Since the interest rate is expressed in the respective countries’ 
commodities, and depreciation is not tax deductible, the profit maximising condition 
implies
<5 +  r(t) =  e (1 -  r { i + l ) )  K,K{t)K~1K ^ {i)1- K (3.25)
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Labour income includes the product of the externality11
w ( i )  L i t )  =  (1 - r(t)) Q it) -  (5 +  r(t - 1)) K ( i  - 1)
From (3.25) lagged, we get
w i t )  L ( t) =  ( 1  — r (t ) )  (1 — « )  Q i t )  (3.26)
Therefore human wealth accumulates as
iZ^t) =  (1 +  r (t  -  1)) n f [t -  1) +  (1 -  ( 1  -  k )  t) (3.27)
Each country’s capital is composed out of domestic output only. It evolves according 
to
K ( t )  =  ( l - 6 ) K ( t - l ) + I ( t )
In the same way the government capital stock is only made of domestic output. It 
evolves according to
K f f t )  =  ( 1 - 6 )  K * ( t  -  1) +  G \ t)
The commodity market clearing conditions are
Q (t) =  G ( t )+ / ( t )  +  C „(t ) +  C3 (t)
QKt) =  <2 ,(t) +  /,(t) +  C'f(t) +  Cf*(t) }
The consumption demands for each commodity can be linked to the consumption 
expenditures. Express each consumption level in the units of the commodity it 
concerns, not in units of the commodity of the country it originates from. Applying
(3.17) I get
Cd(t) =  a C (t )
C A t )  =  Tr-Ct) 
P{t) (3.29)
Cf*(t) =  a*C\t) 
Cd*(t) =  ( l - a ) p ( t ) C V )
where a *  is the share of the foreign commodity in foreign welfare function. For 
government spending, I initially impose that all spending is tax financed
G ( t )  =  r ( t )  Q i t )  (3.30)
11 It is possible to be more rigorous and introduce the proceeds from the externality as equity 
held by the private sector, see for example Benhabib and Velasco (1996). However that will make 
no difference to the results that I present as long as the income from the shares is taxed at the 
same rate as other sources of income
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Relaxing the (3.30) implies complications that require special attention. This issue 
is addressed in Section 9. For now substitute (3.30) and (3.29) in the commodity 
market clearing conditions
( 1  -  r ( t ) )  Q ( t )  -  J(t) +  a C ( i )  +  (1 -  a ) p ( t) C \ t) (3.31)
(1 -  r \ i ) )  Q \ i )  =  I \ i )  +  a * C \ i )  +  C (t) (3.32)
To find the terms of trade, generate the world goods market equilibrium by adding 
(3.31) to (3.32) to get
(1 — r (t ))  Q(t) -  /(t )  -  C (t)
P ( 1( 1  -  r*(t)) Q tQ  -  ~  C \ t )  (  I
We recognise in the denominator the trade balance of the domestic economy and 
in the numerator the trade balance of the foreign economy. I f  this is zero then p(t) 
could be any real number. Thus we need to explicitly model an asymmetry in the 
trade balance if  we wish to maintain a defined price. Foreign lending accumulates 
with the current balance
tf(t) -  (1 +  r ( t  -  1)) J l(t -  1) =  (1 -  t ( t ) )  Q (t) -  1 (1 ) -  C ( t )  (3.34)
J I\ t) -  ( 1  +  r \ i  -  1 )) J f (t -  1 ) =  ( 1  -  t \ t)) Q \ t )  -  1% t) -  C™(t) (3.35)
Using (3.34) and (3.35) in (3.33) we get 
J l ( t )  — (1 +  r ( l  — 1)) J l ( i  — 1)
p(t)
=  J f ( t )  -  (1 +  r \ t  -  1)) ^T(t -  1) (3.36)
and since the foreign lending of one country must be the foreign lending of the other 
or
j l ( t) =  - p ( t) j f ( t )  (3.37)
in each period, we have the condition that
p(t) l + r ( t — 1)
p(t — 1 ) 1  +  r \ l  — 1 )
(3.38)
which, forwarded by one period is the familiar uncovered interest parity condition.
This completes the exposition of the model. The emphasis here has been on any 
individual country. But note that this is a 2  x 2  x 2  model, with two countries two 
agents in each country, and two commodities.
Within each country, we have a model where economic policy is crucial for wel­
fare. Through the accumulation of infrastructure, there is a direct impact of govern­
ment spending on economic growth, but there is also an indirect impact of taxation 
on growth through a reduction in the post-tax return on investment.
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Table 3.1: The complete model
To conserve space I start with equations for the domestic country that have obvious 
foreign counterparts.
C (.)  -  S L m g L M
r n ( t  - 1 )  =  K ( i  -  1) +  Jl(t -  1) +  n % t  - 1 )  (3.40)
K(t) =  ( l - S ) K ( t - l )  +  I(i)  (3.41)
JI{t) =  (1 +  r(t -  1)) JI{t -  1) +  (1 -  r(t)) t) -  /(t) -  C(t) (3.42)
WW =  (1 +  r(t -  1)) A t  - ! )  +  ( ! -  r (t)) (1 -  72) Q(t) (3.43)
Q(t) =  e J f{i -  l )72 X g(t — l )1-72 (3.44)
K s ( t )  =  (1 -  <5) K s ( t  -  1) +  G \ t )  (3.45)
Gi(t) =  r(t)r(t)Q(t) (3.46)
G‘(t) =  ( l -r (t ) )r (t ) )Q (t )  (3.47)
.5 +  r(t) =  e (1 -  r (t +  1)) 7 2  t)1”72 (3.48)
Next I list equations that are specific to the domestic country.
f  fti -  / r © )  i + q t + i )  , .
“  U ( t ' ) )  ( 1  +  r { t ) )1- 1/* ( 1  +  n f l *  V ’
I(t) =  (1 -  t ( 1)) Q ( t ) - a  t) -  p(t) (1 -  cY) CT(t) (3.50)
i r ( t - l )  =  -J(t)/p(t) (3 .37)
Finally this is a list of the equations that are specific to the foreign country
f f t i  -  (  N l \  ^ l + j t j + i )  (3 51i
V P © )/  ( l  +  r t t ) ) l - l/0', ( l  +  fl1 l/<r'
I\t) =  (1 -  r\t)) Q \t) -  -  o fC X t) (3.52)
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4 The steady state o f the model w ith and w ithout growth 
divergence
In this section I investigate the steady state of the model. The Home economy grows 
at the rate n  >  0, therefore the aggregates considered in Section 3 will not converge. 
Instead I consider all aggregates as ratios of GDP and introduce a lowercase notation 
like
4 ( t  Q ( i  -  1 )
I first examine the steady state of the single country model in Subsection 4.1, before 
I turn to the steady state of the two-country model in Subsection 4.2.
%
1 + 1  
1  +  r
k
u f f -
k g
3C =
w, ( 1  +  r )
(1 +  n) (1 + 0 (4.1)
tqh+  k (4.2)
' ( I : : ) 1"
(4.3)
1  +  n  . 
n  +  6 %
(4.4)
( 1  -  k )  ( 1  -  r )  —  
r  — n
(4.5)
e/c7 /cs l “ 7 (4.6)
s ' ( 1  +  n)
6 +  n
(4.7)
T V (4.8)
T  (1 - r) (4.9)
(1 — r ) k ( 1  +  n )/ k (4.10)
c  +  i (4.11)
Table 4.1: The steady state of the single country
4.1 The steady state of the single country
To transform the model to a single economy, it suffices to set p ( t) =  a  =  1 and 
J l ( t )  =  a *  —  0. I consider a steady state where the economy grows at a fixed rate n  
in every period. It straightforward to show that such a steady-state is summarized 
by Table 4.1. It is less straightforward to see the following proposition.
P r o p o s it io n  4.1 There is no steady state of the model with strictly positive con­
sumption unless
l  +  r =  ( l +  * ) ( !  +  n ) a (4.12)
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P r o o f  4.1 To how see that (4.12) must be satisfied, I proceed by contradiction and 
assume that n  and r  can take arbitrary values. Substitute u/Trom (4.5) into (4.2), 
solve (4.10) for k  and substitute in (4.2). Then substitute for %  in (4.1), to see that
/ -  s 1 + 7 1  , w  . 1 + 7 7
(1 — r) k — b (1 -  k) (1 -  r )  ■
8 +  r n
1 +  r
( l  +  n) (1 +  0
(4.13)
A  similar equation for investment can be found when solving (4.10) for k  and sub­
stituting in (4.4)
(1 — t )  k  (n +  5 ) 
t  +  5
(4.14)
Now using the expressions for c  from (4.13) and for i  from (4.14) into (4.11), I find
1 +  rk  ( n  +  6)
1 =  --------;---- h
r +  o
1 +  77 . .1  +  77
K ~  b (1 “  ft) -------
8 +  r 77 ( l  +  n ) ( l  +  0
(4.15)
After some tedious algebra, it can be show that one solution to (4.15) is characterised 
by
/£ =
r +  8
77 +  8
(4.16)
Substituting this equation back into (4.13) we obtain the result that c =  0. How 
this result comes about can be seen when we substitute (4.16) into (4.5) and (4.10). 
This leads to k  =  — wf1, which means that w, =  0. To see that (4.12) must be satisfied, 
first note that using (4.3), (4.12) is equivalent to
1 + f  =
1 +  74
r  — 77
(4.17)
Then it suffices to substitute (4.17) in (4.15) to see that it becomes an identity. 
Q .E .D .
Equation (4.17) is readily interpreted as constraining long run marginal propen­
sity to consume out of income to equal one in the long run. To see this, abstract 
from the distinction between human and physical wealth and consider that wealth 
is the discounted sum of private sector income, Y  in every period. Then
(4.18)
with steady growth and interest rates this becomes
1 +  7-
77
(4.19)
Using (4.19) and (4.17) in (4.1), I find c  — y , which means that equation (4.12) 
constrains the long run propensity to consume out of income to 1.
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4.2 An asymmetric steady state
In Section 2 on page 17, I conjectured that economies can grow at different rates 
all the time when there is an essential factor of production that is not traded. In 
the model of the thesis, infrastructure has that property. However, in all preceding 
models the size of the economy that is slow growing economy will vanish over time,
i.e. it will become arbitrarily small in the world economy.
In the following, I make the assumption of differing growth rate and investigate 
that consequences of this assumption on the variables of the model. I allow the 
domestic economy to grow at the rate n, and the foreign economy to grow at n *  
Consider (3.33) and assume that the trade balance grows at the domestic growth 
rate. Alternatively, consider (3.37) and assume that each country’s foreign assets 
per GDP remains stable. Both approaches immediately result in:
p (t) _  1 +  n* ,f  y t
p ( t + l )  1+71
This immediately leads to our first result. There can be no steady state with an 
imbalance in the rate of growth unless there is a continuous change in the terms of 
trade. Since the domestic economy is growing faster, its terms of trade deteriorate. 
The domestic commodity becomes cheaper to ensure that the share of output of 
the domestic commodity in word output has not changed. It is surprising that this 
result is not more widely known.12 It is the key relationship that enables differential 
growth in the steady state of the economy. Some conceptual difficulty lies in the 
fact that the terms of trade do not stay stable in this steady state.
Using (4.20) in (3.18) (with t '  =  t +  1), I get
(1 +  r ) =  (1 +  fl) (1 +  r a f - '1- ’ ) ( ' - “ J (1 +  n f 1- ^  (1- “ > (4.21)
In the ( n ,  r )  plane, this expression defines the intertemporal “demand” curve of 
Krichel and Levine (1996), the K L  curve. Since a  >  0, this curve is upward sloping. 
The impact of the foreign growth rate on domestic growth depends crucially on the 
elasticity of substitution. In the standard case where the elasticity is smaller than 
one13 we have a negative impact of the foreign growth on domestic growth. Any 
increase in the foreign growth rate will shift the domestic K L  curve upwards in the 
(n, r )  plane. When the elasticity is high, o  <  1, and the impact of the foreign 
growth rate on the domestic growth rate is positive. Note that when the growth 
rates in both countries are equal, then (4.21) simplifies to (4.12). The K L  curve for 
the foreign economy is
(1 +  r* } =  (1 +  «*) (1 +  (1 +  (4.22)
12I believe that this may be the first time this result has been uncovered but it is difficult to verify 
that. The claim may have been made earlier, but not been published since a previous researcher 
may have thought that this result was not worth mentioning.
13The received wisdom a is 2.
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(4.23)
(4.24)
1 +  r *  _  1 +  n*
1 +7 ’ 1 +  77
Dividing (4.21) by (4.22) and making use of (4.23), we get
(l+ 7 7 )y _  1 + f l  
(1 +  77*)  ^_  1 +  A*
where ip —  a  (1 — a )  — (1 — a )  (1 — a * ) and ip* —  a * (  1 — a *) — (1  — a )  (1  — a ) .  
(4.24) must hold as an identity14 for a l l  n *  and 7 7 . Otherwise the system would 
be overdetermined. In a conventional neoclassical growth model, 77 =  77* =  0 and 
the condition (4.24) reduces to the well-known requirement that the discount rates 
in the two economies must be equal for an international steady state with perfect 
capital markets to exist15. If growth is s y m m e t r i c , then in addition we require that 
ip =  <p*. It is straightforward to see that this requires that a  —  a*. I f  there is a 
growth differential we require the more stringent condition that ip —  ip* —  0. The 
equality to zero requires that cx +  a * —  1, in addition to the previous conditions. We 
can summarize
P ro p o s it io n  4.2 There is no steady state in the model unless a =  a* There is 
no steady state with positive growth unless a =  a * There is no steady state with 
different growth rates unless a  +  a * —  1.
The K L  curves of (4.21) and (4.22) can be thought of as intertemporal demand 
curves. For each country, a supply curve can be derived from (4.6). Using (4.10) for 
the private capital stock and (4.8) for the public capital stock, we obtain
,  +  n =  £- V C W > ( T _ L t e ) 7 / (W )r r  (4.25)
This relationship also holds for the foreign economy. Since these curves are depen­
dent on the Cobb-Douglas production function, I will label them the “CD curves” . 
They are downward sloping in the (7 7, r ) space. Since the K L  curves (4.21) and 
(4.22) are upward sloping, a unique equilibrium will exist in each economy. This 
equilibrium is parameterized by the foreign growth rate.
It is interesting to note that the growth rate in the steady state can be related 
to exogenous parameters and policy variables. It does not depend on foreign assets. 
When a country has foreign assets, it will be able to have an expenditure that exceeds 
income. Consumption, but not investment will depend on the foreign assets
c =  (1 -  7U 1 -  r )  +  7 (1 ~  T) Y  ~  n) +  (r  ~- - LL '1,( T r  +  g ( 1 + n )
But note that (3.38) requires that in the steady state
14This becomes clear when looking at equation (4.25) and its foreign counterpart (not repro­
duced). These two equations write the domestic and foreign interest rate as functions of the 
domestic and foreign growth rate, respectively. Thus the system (4.21), (4.22) and (4.23) has only 
two unknowns, n and n*.
1 5  Of course this requirement only holds in models with a homogeneous infinitely lived private 
sector, see Buiter (1981).
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ji is an exogenous variable here. Growth rates and interest rates can not be used to 
explain foreign asset accumulation. Note that this a general characteristic of models 
with infinite lives. In these models any long run accumulation of foreign assets is 
possible, as long as it respects the positivity of consumption in all countries.
It should also be noted that when searching to maximise the domestic growth 
rate, there is no need to take account of the other country’s. Differentiate (4.25) 
and (4.21)
dra =  Y ± I ! d T _ _ ) _ l ± ^ dT (4.26)
r 1 - 7 I - t  K '
The maximisation of growth is reached when r  =  1  — 7 , thus is is independent 
from the foreign growth rate. This is a result that generalises from Devereux and 
Mansoorian (1992).
There are two interpretations for the Subsection. On the one hand, I have shown 
that a situation exists where the domestic and foreign growth rates are different 
forever. To enable such a scenario, I need to ensure that the size of the slow-growing 
economy is not zero in the long run. I show that with a permanent change in the 
terms of trade, this is indeed possible. In this situation, the domestic output will 
grow at the domestic growth rate if expressed in units of the domestic commodity, 
and it will grow at the foreign growth rate if expressed in units of the foreign com­
modity. Under those circumstances, it does not matter for a consumer if output 
grows at a slow or a fast rate, since all the benefits of high growth in the domestic 
commodity output are lost through the decline in the terms of trade. Growth does 
not matter.
An alternative view of my findings comes from the impact on domestic growth 
of a change in foreign growth. I have shown that for common parameter values, an 
increase in foreign growth reduces domestic growth. This is quite a general result. 
Assume that the consumer’s intertemporal substitution is smaller than one, i.e. that 
a percentage change in relative prices leads to a smaller change in consumption 
growth. In this realistic case there is a positive long-run relationship between interest 
rates and growth rates. It does matter little whether it is domestic or foreign growth 
I am referring to. Any increase in the growth rate will lead to an increase in the 
required interest rate. An increase in the interest rate depresses private capital 
accumulation. A  reduction in capital accumulation reduces the rate of growth. 
Therefore an increase of growth in one country raises the world interest rate, and 
depresses growth in another country. These relationships hold under very general 
conditions.
A ll my findings depend crucially on the assumption that the demand shares 
a  and a *  remain fixed. That implies that the consumption demand addressed to 
domestic producers always has a fixed share in world consumption. This is not 
realistic when growth is driven by the accumulation of knowledge. In that case the 
share of each country in the world economy is endogenous. There is a large volume 
of such models, but they all share a logarithmic felicity function that rules out the 
growth externalities that I have considered in this paper. Bringing together both
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strands is a challenge that has yet to be taken up, but I am convinced that it will 
lead to further insight into the process of relative development of different countries.
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In order to study the dynamics of the model I develop a linear-quadratic approxi­
mation of the model. This approximation is a necessary step to apply the solution 
procedures outlined in Appendix A  and B. I am not aware of any other technique 
that will compute a time-consistent trajectory16. Unfortunately it is common prac­
tice to introduce large direct penalties on the use of instruments in this type of 
exercise. On many an occasion they need to be introduced for the model to give 
reasonable results. The origin of the problems lies in the linear nature of the under­
lying set of constraints and the crude approximation that the quadratic form allows 
for and lack of care in the modeling process. An important feature of this thesis is 
to show that when great care is taken in the approximation of the target function 
however, then the linear-quadratic approach can yield equilibrium values that have 
plausible magnitudes, without having to resort to large penalties of the objectives.
5 L in ea r-qu ad ra tic  ap p rox im a tion  and ca lib ra tion
5.1 Linearisation
I linearise about a symmetric steady state, using the notation x { =  x { t )  — x  where x  
is the steady state of a variable. To conserve space, I first write the equations that 
hold for both economies in the sense that the equations for the foreign equations are 
simply “starred” version of the domestic equations.
1 +  r m,
ct =
(5.1)
H - iu,
( 1 + 0 ( 1  +  " )  ^  +  ( 1 + 0  (1 +  n) r‘ “ 1 
u *( l +  r )  tq ( l +  r )
~  ( l + { ) 2 ( l  +  n) 4 l "  (1 +  0  (1 +  n )2
1 — 8 (1 — 8 ) k  . , ,
ftt — 7 ——  ftt-i — - j7 —— wr Tii +  h  (5-2)
1 +  n (1 +  n ) 2
r { —  —67 ft7-1 ftgl~7Tt+1 —  e (1 —  r) 7 (1 —  7 ) ft7-2 ftg l~7 ki
+  e (1 —  r) 7 (1 —  7 ) ft7--1 ft5 - 7  k f
=  (5.4)
1 + n  k
, *  1 - 5 , *  ( l- < 5 ) fc s , j /E K ,
k * =  T T ^ k l ' - ~ ( T Z W n t  +  91 ( }
g\ ~  r r t  +  rTt
h w)  1 +  r  b (1 +  r)  u f  , \
=  T 7 —  U -i +  t ~ — «if_i -  V ' ,~'~vT U i ~  t1 “  ^ T i1 +  n 1 +  n (1 +  n ) 2
g ct = (  l - r ) r t - r r t  (5.6)
16There is an old mimeo by Albert Marcet on that topic, but it was never formally published. 
It is basically incomprehensible, but for what I understand of it, it can not deal with a model like 
ours
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The following equations only hold for each country separately
1 +  r ji(l +  r) a .
M  ■'h-i “  J 7 ~ . \o U i +  i I—  r t-i — R  — H  ~~ c t (5.7)1 +  n (1 - \ - n )1 1 + n
1 + f (l-a)(l-«) l + f 
& » -  —  6 +    — P m
(1-<0(1-or) l + f_ , (l + {)(l-l/a)_ 
Pi H  T —-------------  Ti
a  p  1 +  r
_ l  +  5 d. (1 - O-) (1 - a) l +  £_
f m - — 6  ~ ------------ —  PH-1
(5.8)
(5.9)
( l - < 7 ) ( l - a )  l  +  f  ( l  +  f )  ( 1  -  1 / c r )q------------------------------ p i    r
<7 p 1 +  r
V P *
P t+ i =  Pt +  y —  r t -  -r— J i  
1 +  r 1 + r *
i i  =  — T i — a  c t — (1 — a ) p c* — (1 — a ) cpt (5.10)
* (1 -  a ) (1 -  a )  c
h  = - T i - a  c t -------—  a  +  y  Pt
=  fci_i +  tiq_i +  (5-11)
t% -i  =  & *_i +  v f i _  i ------ +  ^ 2  P t—i (5.12)
5.2 The welfare function
Abstracting for the moment from the fact that I have a two-country model with 
government spending, consider the target function
y(t) = E  e l'~ l C(? E  1 (5-13)
l ' = l
Introducing c(t) =  C ( t ) / Q ( l ) ,  n (t) =  (Q (t) — Q (t — 1 ))/Q (t — 1) and removing 
constant terms, maximising (5.13) is equivalent to maximising
t r ( t ) = x y - v
1 —cr
t ' = l
1 — a
(5.14)
Now defining a modified discount rate
q =  q (1 +  n)1—a (5.15)
and introducing the notation
Y  =  nf.j +  nt (5.16)
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the quadratic approximation of (5.14) is given by17
- l U f
i'=i
(5.17)
where
Uf — c ° (1 +  n )  a ct +     ^c ° (1 +  n) ° 77t
1 — Q
— o c  u 1 (1 +  n ) 1 a —■
+
1 — a
2 1 - q
g  (1 — a )  c l ~ a
( x +  „ ) - ! - *  IS. (5.18)
 7-------- r— 777 C( +  t:-- ,w / ---- T7—-  77t 777_i+ (1 +  77)°* 4 (1 - Q) (1 +  77)1+°‘ 4 1
Integrating government consumption is straightforward since it is added with a coef­
ficient v c. However simulations based on (5.18) with added government consumption 
terms show that the resulting function is not accurate enough for the calculations 
to work. In the precommitment case, the calculation of the Riccati (A. 17) of page 
101 fails. The procedure of Subsection A.3 does not converge either.
A  more accurate approximation of the welfare criterion can be achieved by replac­
ing the l in e a r  terms in C(, g £ and T7t, by their quadratic approximations gained from 
expanding (5.1), (5.4) and (5.6) to a further degree. Adding all these components
17This can be seen when writing out the first few terms of the sum.
U i =  c-<T (1 +  n)1-0- ct + c1~ cr (1 + n ) ~ ff n\ — cr c-1-<T (1 + n ) 1~ ff c2/2
+ (1 — oj c-cr (1 +n)~cr ctnt - ere1 - '7 (1 + n)-1-<7 nf/2 + Q[c~a (1 ■+ n)0~°r) ct+1
+ c1-£7 (1 + n)*1-')-1 77?+1 - o-c-1-0- (1 + n)^-) c2+1/2
+ (1 -  ct) c1_<7 (1 4- 7it+i nf + (1 - cr) c~a (1 + ct+i n\+1
-  o-c1"'7 (1 + n f i1- ^ - 2 n \/2 - a c 1^  (1 + n)^ 1-£r)~2 n2+1/2]
+ q2 [c— ( 1  +  n)b -Y> ct + 2  +  c1-cr ( 1  + ify1 " ' ) - 1 nf+ 2
-  cr c- 1 - *7 (1 + n ) ( 1 _ f f ) _ 2  c2+ 2 / 2  + (1 -  cr) c~" ( 1  +  ct + 2  n ?+ 2
+ (1 - cr) c1-cr (1 + nt+i n t +  (1 - a) c1~a (1 4- n)Y_cr)~2 nt+2 nj+1
-  crc1"* (1 + n)ri~ff)-2 n 2/2 - a c 1- *  (1 + rfy1" ^ " 2 n2+1/2
- cr c1-17 (1 4- n)(1 -<d - 2  n2+2 / 2 ] ...
39
and dividing through (1 +  n)1-<T gives
_ c a w, (1 -+ r )  9 
U i =  c  ct +  — tttt:-----zr n 2
(1 +  n )3 (1 +  0  n
+
c  a iju, (1 +  r )
*%-! T1-1
( l  +  n ) ( l + e ) 3St ( l  +  0 ( l  +  n)
c ~ a (1 +  r )  c  c ~ a (1 +  r )
( l  +  0 2 ( l  +  n) et "  (1 +  0  (1 +  n)2 ^ " 1 nt
C  a  ui, C a  VJ,
+
(1 +  0 2 (1 +  n) 4-1 "  (1 +  0  (1 +  n )2 1-1
c ~ a (1 +  r )  m,
f , i n i +  v c g c g t
n t
(1 +  0 2 (1 +  n ) 2
-  v c 9 Z~ °  n  rt +  [c1-<T +  v c #d-<7] - — - —^
L J 1 — p 1 +  n
- [ c l- '  +  « efld - ] ( 1 - 7 ) 'r i  r* ^ 1 ^
2 ( 1 - 0
e2 a112
fts
1 - 0
[c1 cr +  nc#d a ]
n t
2 (1 +  n )2
1 +  n n t Qt+  _  ©  7 T ?  ^  ct +  ( x “  <T)1  -r n
+ (J^a+V +c^ ]"tntl
(5.19)
For the two-country model I use the consumption expenditure approach. Recall that
Ca(t) =  orc(t)
. I - a  (5.20)
Thus the term c(t) of (5.14) according to (3.2) corresponds to the expression a a (1 — 
a )a-1 c(t) p (t )1-Q. Therefore the equivalent to the maximisation of (3.1) is the max­
imisation of
~  , .  [p (t)“  + ( t )  n ! * = i ( i + « © ) ) ]  
t / ( t ) = E < ?  “ --— T T 7    - (5-2!)
t'=l
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This implies that in the two-country case, (5.19) is replaced by
Ul _  H - i )  <i-»> c- .  Cl +  c - ^ ( l +  r )
U l ~ P  °  C‘ +  ( l + „ ) 3 ( l + f ) ">
p ( a - l )  ( l - < r )  c- a  ^ ( j  _|_ y )  ^   ^ p ( o ; —l )  ( l —cr) Q-a
+  ( l  +  n ) ( l  +  f)3  f l  +  ( l  +  £) (1 +  n ) W'1- 1 ? V l 
p te - i)  ( i - 0-) c~a ( j  -|_ r )  ^ (1-cr) c~a (1 +  r )
( l  +  £)2( l  +  n) "4l_1 ?l (1 + f)  (1 +  n)2 ““ - 1 " l
p(a-l) (I-0-) ^  ^ p ^"1) C1-07) Q~cr ^
”  (1 +  0 2 (1 +  n) rt_1 ”  (1 +  0  (1 +  n )2 rt_1 nt
( a - l ) ( l - c r ) c - c r ( 1 + 7 . )
+  *  ( 1 +  ^ ( l  +  n )2 +  ^
-  v c pc 17 n  r t +  [p{a J) (1 a) c1 a +  uc ga  a] 
_  [ p ( - l ) ( l - )  cl -  +  V
-  c r p f t 'X 1--7) c - ” - 1 4 -  - a V c g ^ - 1 ^
ft ft
^  ^  T.-Cq— 11 Cl— cJ _1— cr i _cl—<r1
nt
1 — £ 1 +  n
fct-i * f v 2
A: (5.22)
l - £ ^  ' ta J 2 (1 +  n)2
~ .(c t—1 ) ( 1 —cr) £ —cr nc~~cr
+  ^ - ^ E  }  +  n n‘ C t + ( l - g ) f Y ” ‘ g ‘
+  (1 Y ( l Y y  [P(“ " )(1“ p) ^  n tn tx
+  (a — 1) (1 — cr) p ff"1) (l-o-)- ! c ^ p t
+  (a  -  1) (1 -  c r)  nt Pt
+  (a  -  1) (1 -  a) ( (a  -  1) (1 -  a) -  1) p ^  ^ - 2 c1” "  ^
+  (a — 1) (1 — cr)2 p(a_1) (1-°‘) -1c- £r Ctpt
Note that the model would not converge with a more simple target!
A ll results in Sections 6, 7 and 8 were computed using the ACES package, see 
Gaines, al Nowaihi, and Levine (1989). This is a library that can be used on any 
F77 compiler in conjunction with the NAG  numerical routines. The programs used 
to compute the results as well as the ACES libraries are available on request from 
the author. NAG  is a commercial programme and needs to be obtained separately, 
but it is very widely used.
In actual calculations there are two adjustments to the theoretical setup devel­
oped in this section. An interesting problem arises from the definition of r i f f  In 
an economy with perpetual growth, there is no steady state to this variable. This 
variable must be included in the state vector. But the procedure that calculates the 
time-consistent strategy will look for a solution with a stable state vector. Therefore 
in the time-consistent solution, there will be no long run change of growth if I in-
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troduce nb as in (5.16). I will be referring to this effect as the “accumulator effect” 
in the following. The accumulator effect on the growth rate implies the absence of 
a change in long run growth. Through the logic of the linear representation of the 
model, it also implies that the instruments are set to the initial steady-state values 
in the long run, i.e. =  0. Thus from any steady state, the system under
a time-consistent policy would be going back to the steady state where it started 
from, which is not a very satisfactory feature. To circumvent the problem, it would 
suffice to reduced the root below 1 by a very small amount. In practice it turns out 
that if the root is too close to 1, the stationary requirement still has an important 
negative impact on long run growth. The results of the time consistent calcula­
tions are convergent in the sense that as the root approaches 1, the long run rate of 
growth change approaches 0. After a large number of experiments, I set the root to 
.99. Note that the variable n h is only used in the specification of the government’s 
objective and it is not used anywhere else.
A  second case where the calculations diverge from the theory that I set out here 
is the presence of a startup penalty. Within the ACES software, it is not possible to 
specify inequality constraints on the behaviour of the system. Thus it is not possible 
to state that in fact, consumption must always be positive and that the tax must 
lie between zero and one. Thus, in the case of the optimal policy, optimisation in 
date 1 implies setting the tax to infinity and satisfy all spending from the revenue 
generated in the first period. To exclude that problem I need to install a very small 
penalty on the instruments. These can vary from one regime to another and are 
discussed with the description of the results. A ll are so small that their removal 
for the calculation of the time-consistent regime makes no change in the results for 
these regimes.
Note that the first problem only affects the time-consistent solution, whereas 
the second problem only affects the optimal control calculation. However I kept the 
same programme for both calculations, unless otherwise stated in the results. In 
every other respect the optimisation routines exactly replicate the objectives as set 
out here.18 They do converge and the results are meaningful. This shows that if the 
linear-quadratic approximation is being prepared in a very careful way, then it is 
possible to obtain meaningful results out o f the numerical exercises without having 
to resort to heavily penalising instrument changes.
5.3 The calibration
There are two approaches towards calibrating a model. The first consists in collect­
ing data about observable variables like consumption, investment, growth, etc, and 
deduce variables that are not observed from the steady state of the model. This 
approach is simple and intuitive. A  second approach would do the opposite, i.e. use 
different scenarios of the unobserved variables to see whether in the steady state 
these will give values for the observed variable that conform to observation. This 
method has the advantage o f allowing for “what if” simulations to study the effect
18The programmes are available on request.
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Category A B C
0 Total expenditure 1194.60 501.66 438.77
1 General public services 78.71 14.25 23.63
2 Defense 293.54
3 Public order and safety 10.57 2 0 . 0 1 40.83
4 Education 21.50 169.14 191.57
5 Health 154.19 87.30 36.27
6 Social security & welfare 317.82 82.74 32.39
7 Housing and community amenities 32.62 3.61 13.01
8 Recreation, cultural & religious affairs 3 . 2 1 2.67 13.69
9 Fuel & energy 5.41 .26 2.14
1 0 Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 21.89 8.99 2.42
1 1 Mining, manufacturing 8z construction .64
1 2 Transports & communications 29.89 46.74 27.23
13 Other economic affairs & services 38.29 7.04 2 . 2 0
14 Other expenditures 187.17 58.91 53.39
Table 5.1: 1990 US government expenditure. Column A  is “consolidated central 
government” expenditure, B is “state region and province government” , and C is 
“local government” (source: IM F Government Finance Statistics Yearbook)
of changes in the unobserved exogenous parameters. I adopt a mixed approach here. 
The main source for parameter values is Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1994). They 
set r  =  2 2 %, g  — 98% (which corresponds to a ~  2%), a  —  2.0, k , —  36%, n  =  2 %  
and 5 =  4%. In addition we need two more parameters that are r, and 7 . The latter 
is difficult to quantify, but a reasonable baseline value should be the ratio of private 
capital in the total capital stock, i.e. we use 7  =  k / [ k  +  k g) .  To obtain an estimate 
for r I collected data for various categories of US government expenditure numbered 
1-14 in Table 5.1. I assume that the categories 4, 5 and 1 2  are the expenditures 
contributing to the capital stock of the government. I can then compute r, the pro­
portion of investment expenditure, as r ps 36%. The remaining parameter values 
are derived using the steady state relationships as set out in Table 5.2. The alert 
reader will have noticed that Table 5.2 only calibrates the single-country version of 
the model. The calibration for two countries is based on two single countries. I set 
a  =  . 5  and ji —  0  and think of the world as consisting of two economies with the 
same characteristics. It would of course be interesting to calibrate two asymmet­
ric economies, in particular two economies at a different rate of long run growth. 
One could then examine the success of various regimes in closing the growth gap. 
However I have not found a state-space representation of such a model.
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#c =  r  — r  r 0.141
9 l - r r «  0.079
n  +  8
1.346
r  =  ( 1  +  a) ( 1  +  n ) a — 1 «  0.061
£ =  1
( 1  +  I- ) * - 1 ( 1  +
«  24.75
k, ( 1  -  r ) ( 1  +  n )
k  = --------;------------
8 +  r
«  2.830
7 n +  J
z =  k -------
1  +  n
«  0.166
h ( i + « ) ( i - ' r) ( i - « ) 12.36VJ,
r  — n
w, =  ft +  w ) «  15.19
( 1  +  r)
( 1  +  n) ( 1  +  0
££ 0.614
1  +  n 
ft7fts1-7
^  0.458
ft
7 ~  ftg +  ft
^  0.678
Table 5.2: Calibration where n ,  cr, a, 8, 7 , r and r  are fundamental
44
6 Shocks in  th e  L in ea r M o d e l
The comparative static analysis based on the steady state has the advantage that 
it uses the full model. But it does not take into account any transitional dynamics 
between one state and an alternative state. This transition is discussed here in the 
context of the linearized from of the model, equations (5.1) to (5.12). I examine the 
impact of changes in the policy variable and the transition to a new steady state. To 
compare the open economy with the case of a closed economy, I compare the effect 
of a .5% change in a policy variable in the closed economy with a 1% change in the 
Home economy only. From Figure 6.3 onwards, I represent the domestic variable 
by a 0, the foreign variable with a □, and the reference value in a single country 
that corresponds to a shock of half the size of the shock in the two-country world 
with a + . Correspondingly, if x  is a variable of the model, then I will denote x { 
the deviation from the steady state of the domestic value, x *  the deviation from the 
steady state of the foreign value, and the deviation from the steady state of both 
domestic and foreign value, for a shock of half the impact in both countries. A ll 
figures on the second axis of every graph are percentages.
A ll shocks in this section are permanent,19 because I wish to examine the prop­
erties of the long-run steady state with growth differentials. Assuming that there 
is a shift from symmetric to asymmetric policies, I am interested to find out what 
happens to the terms of trade and to foreign assets. Note that there are no impli­
cations for the government budget because all are balanced-budget changes. There 
are two policy variables in the model, the tax rate r  and the fraction of expendi­
ture devoted to infrastructure r. A  shock to the latter is more straightforward to 
understand than a shock to the former. When considering a change in economic
Figure 6.1: Foreign assets r shock 0> t  shock □
policy in the domestic country only, the question of asymmetric growth immediately
19In an endogenous growth model like ours, any temporary change in policy would lead to a 
permanent change in the long-run growth. Jones (1995) and Kocherlakota and Yi (1996) have 
used that fact to test if the time series of US output have that property.
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Figure 6.2: Terms of trade p i ,  r shock 0, r  shock □
arises, because there is a unique mapping from the policy instruments to the interest
and growth rates. From the results in Section 4, one would expect that the relative 
price rises continuously in order to make up for the differential in growth rates. For 
example we would expect that lim^oo pt =  oo, when rt =  1 V t >  1. But this is not 
the case here. In fact the results of the simulation are that when differential growth 
arises, we have a continuous adjustment of the foreign assets
=  j it—i +  when rt =  1 V t >  1 ( f t l )
where $  is general placeholder for a constant. This is pictured as the 0 line in Figure
6.1. Figure 6.2 introduces another striking feature of the solution
P i  =  $ when rt =  1, V t >  1 (6.2)
The shock on r produces a once-and-for-all f a l l  of relative price, a change in the 
opposite direction then the one predicted by the steady-state analysis. Thus the 
results that I find here are the opposite of the results in Section 4. Remember that 
in the comparative statics comparison, the terms of trade are subject to continuous 
change and the foreign assets remain unchanged. Here the terms of trade remain 
constant and the foreign assets accumulate. There is no steady state for foreign 
assets.
The only common element with the earlier results are that both steady states are 
incomplete, in the sense that there is a subset of variable that continues to change, 
whereas another set of variables remain constant over time. Despite the continuous 
rise of foreign assets, most other variables are stable. Thus we do not reach a steady 
state in all variables, but a “semi” steady state, where only a large subset of the 
variables remains constant.
To understand that these results nevertheless makes sense, it is instructive to look 
at diagrams that trace the evolution of selected variables over time. In Subsection
6.1 I discuss the infrastructure shock, and in Subsection 6.2 the shock to taxation.
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When the government increases the fraction allocated to infrastructure, say rt =  1% 
V t >  1, then government investment is increased, and government consumption 
falls by the same amount. Thus there is no change in government spending and 
no impact on taxation. This greatly simplifies the problem under study. In ad­
dition, the felicity function (3.2) implies that there is no direct substitution from 
public to private consumption, i.e. the private sector does not compensate with 
higher private consumption for the withdrawal of publicly provided consumption 
commodities. Any impact on consumption will be the result of indirect changes in 
the macroeconomic environment that the private sector faces. Without the assump­
tion of additive separability the various effects of government policy would be more 
difficult to disentangle.
The constancy of the terms of trade implies that the interest rate is the same in 
both countries. Its evolution is the same as in the single country case, see Figure 6.3. 
This implies from (5.8) and (5.9) that the evolution of £ is the same in both countries, 
because the interest rate is identical and the terms of trade are the constant over 
time. However, the fact that the evolution of £ is identical does not imply that =  £* 
V t. Since the reluctance rate £ is not a predetermined variable, it will not be the same 
unless the terminal conditions are identical in the domestic and the foreign economy. 
From the discussion on page 32 the terminal condition could loosely be interpreted 
as the long run unity of the marginal propensity to consume out of income. Since 
domestic income rises faster then foreign income, the terminal condition can not 
be the same. A  natural initial idea would be to argue that since in the domestic 
economy, income grows faster, consumption must grow faster as well, which would 
mean that the marginal propensity to consume must increase. However that is not 
the case here, since the increase in £ corresponds to an slowdown in consumption, 
rather than an increase.
The rise of £ in the fast-growing country may be counter-intuitive, but can be 
quite easily explained referring to the fundamental equation (4.12). Imagine a dy­
namic form of this equation as
1 +  r (t  -  1) =  (1 +  a )  (1 +  n ( t ) Y  (6.3)
and substitute into (3.20) to see that
-1 | _  i | l Y n ( t + l )  ( l  +  n ( t + l ) ) ( l  +  n ( t + 2 ) )
1 +  CW =  1 +  x - 7 (i)-  +  (1 +  r (t ) )  (1 +  r (t  +  1 )} • • ■ (6.4)
clearly suggesting that the higher is growth, the higher is the reluctance to consume 
out of wealth.
The numerical results suggest that stability of the model requires that in the 
domestic country =  230% whereas =  —250%. These appear to appear to be 
large but are in fact quite small changes to the initial steady-state value of 24.752. 
The movement of f  is illustrated in Figure 6.4. The evolution of f  from period 2 
onwards is the same in both countries and is identical to the evolution of £ in the 
reference case for the domestic economy.
6.1 A  shock to infrastructure expenditure
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Figure 6.4: rt =  1, V t > 1: £t 0, £t Ct <>w* +
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The most important feature that distinguishes the open economy from the closed 
economy is that £ is allowed to raise in the domestic economy and fall in the foreign 
economy, whereas in the domestic reference case it remains close to the steady-state 
reference value. An increase (decrease) in the reluctance rate implies that domestic 
(foreign) residents consume less (more) out of accumulated wealth. Consumption 
itself is determined by the stock of wealth and the propensity to consume from 
it. For the stock of wealth— which is not predetermined— I note that through the 
increase (decrease) in growth, the domestic (foreign) human wealth jumps upwards 
(downwards). Since the current growth rate is predetermined, the jump in human 
wealth reaches its peak in t =  1 rather than in t =  0.
Figure 6.5: human wealth when rt =  1, V t >  1: w ^_i <>, ^1{_ 1 □, ^ ht_ 1 +
0 10 20 30 40 50 years
Figure 6.6: consumption when rt =  1, V t >  1: Ci Q5 c * □, ct +
The initial impact on consumption in the domestic (foreign) economy is the 
difference of the impact of the increase (decrease) in human wealth and the decrease 
(increase) of the marginal propensity to consume. As illustrated in Figure 6.6 the 
latter effect is more important than the former, which implies that consumption
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falls (rises) initially in the domestic (foreign) economy. This impact effect is the 
principal cause of the accumulation of assets by one country over the other. The 
accumulation of assets allows domestic (foreign) consumption to rise (fall). In fact 
limt-^oo =  oo, i.e. consumption is not stationary because asset accumulation is 
not.
Figure 6.7: investment when rt =  1, V t >  1: 0, i *  □, 2t +
The discussion has until now left out the supply side of the model. In the 
state-space representation, investment is determined as a residual. On impact, the 
decrease in domestic consumption and the increase in foreign consumption mostly 
cancel out. The difference is the terms of trade effect that is constant both in the 
long and the short run. The drop in the terms of trade allows for cheaper imports 
in the domestic economy, and more expensive imports in the foreign economy. As 
a consequence, the foreign residents reduce their demand for the Home commodity. 
According to 5.10 this effect increases domestic investment. This is a permanent 
shock. Hence the drop in the terms of trade permanently fuels a decrease in total 
consumption demand in the domestic economy, which allows for higher investment, 
which again allows for higher growth in the domestic economy. This is the key 
element that explains the divergence of the growth rate and the fact that the impact 
of the shock is so much larger in the open economy when compared to the closed 
economy, something that could be considered a puzzle at first. From Figure 6.7 it 
is also interesting to note that investment increases over time. From Figure 6.8 the 
increase in investment is by no way sufficient to halt the decline in the capital stock 
per GDP that is caused by the expansion in GDP, the second term on the right 
hand side o f equation (5.5). In the foreign economy, the decline of the capital stock 
occurs through the lack of investment, here the slowdown in growth moderates the 
fall in the per-GDP capital stock.
In the domestic economy, the infrastructure stock increases from period 1 on­
wards. In the foreign economy, the infrastructure increases as well, from period 2 
onwards, since the growth rate has declined; recall that k s is measured in per-GDP 
terms. Figure 6.9 sums up the effect of the fiscal policy change on growth. The
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Figure 6.8: capital when r { =  1, V t >  1: &t-i 0, k l - i  □, /ct_ i +
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Figure 6.9: growth nt when rt =  1, V t > 1: nt 0, n\ □, nt <—* +
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crucial importance of the openess of the eeonomy figures promiently here. Contrary 
to the situation that would prevail if the economy was closed, in a two-country 
world the growth effect is much more important. A  fall in the terms of trade oc­
curs. It makes the domestic commodity more expensive. In this linearized version 
of the model, the budget shares do not remain constant. The domestic economy 
pays its imports cheaper, thus leaving room for additional investment. That addi­
tional investment fuels growth. Another part of that reduced expenditure is spent 
on accumulating assets over the foreign economy. To ensure that high growth in the 
domestic economy is compatible with slow growth other economy, the stock o f for­
eign assets in the domestic economy, as well as its consumption expediture increases 
beyond all bounds. This ensures that the domestic economy eventually consumes 
the additional output that it generates.
6.2  A shock to taxation
The next shock to consider is a once-and-for-all increase in taxation in the home 
country. This shock has more complicated effects. Since the interest agreed upon 
in period t is subject to taxation at period t +  1, there is an additional element of 
surprise to the private sector if the government changes the tax rate in period 1. To 
avoid that additional complication, I consider here an increase of the tax from period 
2 only. To further simplify, I consider an increase in tax that is used to augment 
government consumption only, i.e., there is no change in infrastructure expenditure. 
Thus I avoid the problem that at unchanged r this shock has a component that 
pushes the economy like the shock discussed in Subsection 6.1.
The issue of source-based vs. residence-based taxation should be kept in mind 
here. Under the residence principle, the pre-tax interest rates must be equalised 
internationally if the terms of trade remain constant. Since the pre-tax interest 
rate is equal to the marginal product of capital that would imply that the marginal 
product o f capital is equalised in all countries and that the international allocation 
of investment is efficient. I have adopted source-based taxation here. This will allow 
countries to impact on pre-tax interest rates using domestic taxation, a view that is 
more realistic. It implies that the post-tax returns are equalised when the terms of 
trade are constant.
When the tax is imposed the pre-tax interest rate rises, but not by as much as 
the tax increase, thus the post-tax interest rate r  actually declines. In the domestic 
economy this is the effect of the first term on the left-hand side of (5.3). In the 
foreign economy, the tax effect is absent. From Figure 6.3, in the absence of a terms 
of trade effect, the interest rate would fall, then recover to some extent, but not 
enough to come back to the baseline level. Note that the interest rate falls in period 
1, i.e. before the impact of the shock. The differences of interest rates visible in 
Figure 6.10 are thus explained by the changes in the terms of trade, following the 
□ed line of Figure 6.2.
The rise in government consumption spending should be expected to make the 
domestic commodity realitively more expensive. But on impact, we observe a rise in
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Figure 6.10: interest rate when #£+1 =  r t+i =  1, V t >  1: r t- i  ^  0, ftfti D>
Figure 6.11: reluctance rate when #£+1 =  rt+1 =  1, Vt > 1: ft ^  0, ft* *—* □,
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the terms of trade (see Figure 6.2), because of the divergence of interest rates that 
appears with the imposition of the tax at home. However, in the long run the terms 
of trade fall and end up lower than the baseline. From Figure 6.10 we see that the 
domestic interest rate falls by much more than the foreign interest rate. However 
both interest rates converge after 30 years and the resulting drop in the long run 
equals the drop experienced in the single country reference case. Figure 6.11 shows 
that the changes in the marginal propensity to consume are very similar to the ones 
observed in Figure 6.4. The initial impact in not as large because the initial rise 
in p  pushes for an increase in domestic consumption. However this effect does not 
dominate. Similarly, the downward movement of the interest rate should increase 
the reluctance to consume wealth, but this effect overshadowed by the open-economy 
divergence of £.
Figure 6.12: investment when g\+ l  —  r l+i =  1, V t >  1: * 0, i\  □? h  +
In the foreign economy, the fall in the post-tax interest rate increases investment. 
The initial increase in the relative price for the foreign commodity also contributes to 
the increase in investment. By comparison with the single country case, we can see 
that the price effect accounts for about 50% of the initial rise. This effect dissappears 
in later period and consequently the rise in the foreign capital stock levels off. In 
the domestic economy, the increase in taxes and the adverse terms of trade effect 
combine to reduce investment. The initial fall in investment roughly equals the 
increase in taxation. Overall there is a decline in the domestic capital stock and an 
increase in the capital stock abroad illustrated in Figure 6.12.
Figure 6.13 illustrate the movement of the infrastructure. /cf =  0 since the stock 
is predetermined, /cf is also zero because the the policy change only occurs in period
2. The domestic (foreign) infrastructure to GDP ratio then increases (declines) 
because GDP declines (increases). This movement of capital to GDP ratios should 
be kept in mind when considering the evolution of the private capital stock in 6.14. 
Lower interest rates make for a sustained increase in the capital stock in the foreign 
economy. In the domestic economy there is a sustained fall of the private capital 
stock to GDP ratio despite the fall of domestic GDP.
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Figure 6.13: infrastructure when #f+1 =  r i + i  =  1, V t >  1: /cf_x 0,
k & t - i +
Figure 6.14: capital when g$+1 =  r t+1 =  1, V t >  1: ftt- i  ^  0, fc*-i D> &t-
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The path of the growth rate is drawn in Figure 6.15. no is predetermined. In the 
next period the increase in taxes is announced, but not implemented. In the single 
country case private investment increases in that period, because the pre-tax interest 
rate does not increase fully by the amount of the tax, and the crowding-out effect 
of increased government consumption on the commodity market will only impact 
in the next period. In the foreign economy, the impact of lower interest rates and 
the upward jump in the terms of trade increase investment and therefore growth, 
but the latter effect fades out. In the domestic economy, higher taxes discourage 
investment and therefore the growth rate is lower, despite the long run fall in the 
terms of trade.
The main puzzle of these results are here one country growing slower than its 
neighbour but acquiring assets over it. The main difference with case of the increase 
in infrastructure is that the path of consumption does not immediately follow a 
straight line since the transitional dynamics the terms of trade result in higher 
domestic consumption and lower foreign consumption. But in the long run the 
picture is the same as Figure 6.6. As suggested by Figure 6.1 the accumulation 
process is almost identical in the cases of raising the government infrastructure and 
of raising government spending. It is puzzling to note that these two shocks have 
very little in common that would point to the origin of the result that foreign assets 
accumulate.
It is easy to see why the accumulation of assets in the first period is compat­
ible with the other simulation results. Using (5.10) in (5.7), the symmetry of the 
calibration and some initial conditions, it can be shown that
* 1  _  £* ”  6. , /i \7  = T T F  + ( )P1
which is a positive term. What appears puzzling is that the shock is persistent in the 
sense that the accumulation of foreign assets remains constant in all period. This is 
addressed in the next Subsection.
An interesting experiment is to simultaneously allow for the infrastructure shock 
in the foreign economy and the public consumption shock in the domestic economy. 
In that case the long run growth rate in the domestic economy declines by almost 
.2%, whereas the foreign economy’s growth rate increases by .13%. The annual 
increment in the foreign assets is only .264%, which is substantially lower then the 
long 4.48% for the infrastructure shock and 4.745% for the tax increase. This clearly 
demonstrates yet again that asset accumulation is not directly related to the growth 
gap between countries.
Let us summarize what we have learned from these simulations. The response to 
shocks produces both changes to the terms of trade and to foreign lending. Terms 
of trade changes level out in the long run. The terms of trade move to a new 
steady-state value, and since the solution of the model is not affected by the value 
of the terms of trade, the effect of terms of trade changes is transitory. However 
the changes to foreign lending are permanent. Foreign lending tends in the long run 
towards showing a unit root behaviour. Consumption shows the same long run unit 
root because it depends on wealth which of course includes foreign assets.
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6.3 Discussion of shock equilibria
The most striking feature of the simulation presented here is the unit root in foreign 
assets. That is, when we have a permanent shock, foreign assets evolve as
a i  =  A i„ i +  constant (6-5)
It is easy to dismiss this feature as an artifact of linearisation. In this subsection, 
I will show that the relationship (6.5) is a feature of any long run solution of the 
model and not related to linearisation.
Let’s first return to the subject of Subsection 4.1, the conditions for existence 
of a steady state. In particular I show a condition (4.12) that links the long run 
interest rate to the long run growth rate. This equation applies in a steady state o f a 
closed economy. To see if it extends to an open economy, I write the three equations 
of Table 4.1 that change from the closed to the open economy
v j l  +  r )
( l  +  n ) ( l  +  0  ^
vj, =  w ) +  k  -f- a  (4-20
1 — r =  c +  z +  7 — - a (4-D-O
1 +  n v '
It is then straightforward to see that with these equations (4.13) becomes
/ . 1 +  n N 1 +  n
(1 — r) k  — b (1 — ft) (1 — r )  b a
K ’  8 +  r  r  -  n
(1 — r ) k  (n +  8 ) n  — rH   b   a
r  +  8 1 +  n
1 +  r
Again, equation (4.17) gives a solution to this equation. Thus if a steady state exists 
where foreign assets are in the steady state, then (4.12) has to hold, if we exclude 
the other solution that gives zero consumption when foreign assets are zero. The 
calibration of the model simulated in this section is of course built on the assumption 
that (4.12) holds both for the domestic and the foreign economy.
To study the accumulation of foreign assets consider (3.34). Substituting in
(3.19) I arrive at
m  = (1 +  t  t m ~J(t ~ 15 +  (1 ' T(t))  Q ( t ) "  m
( X ( t -  1) +  ffl1) t -  1)) (1 +  r ( t -  1))
1 +  £ W
Write this equation is per-GDP form
* (1) -  ( i r s ( i ) * ) + l f )  » < * - » >  +  g  -  + »  -
(fc(t — 1) +  yjfft — 1)) (1 +  r (t  — 1))
(1 +  n (t)) (1 +  £ (t))
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Now assume that r, n  and £ are in the steady state, then from Proposition 4.1 we 
know that for the parameter choice that corresponds to a closed economy, we have
■a(t) =  4 t -  1) +  1 -  r (t ) -  i(t) -  fc(t ~  X) +  ^  ~  9 . (6.6)
That is where the unit root appears! In any long run steady state where taxes and 
investment are constant shares of GDP, where growth and interest rates are constant 
and therefore when capital and human wealth are constant multiples of GDP, foreign 
assets will evolve as a unit root.
In the starting lines of this subsection, I have shown that for steady state with 
positive consumption, equation 4.12 still holds when foreign assets are a constant 
fraction of GDP. Then I show that this implies that foreign assets are following a unit 
root. Clearly if the foreign assets follow a unit root, they can not be constant. This 
circular reasoning shows that in fact there is no s ta b le  steady state where both all 
aggregates and interest and growth rates are constant a n d  where foreign assets are 
stable. Anything else can be stable, but then foreign assets won’t. That is exactly 
what my Figure 6.1 shows. This striking phenomenon is rooted “deep” in the model 
property. It has nothing to do with either a particular choice of parameters or with 
the linearisation.
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Figure 6.17: consumption when rt =  1, V t >  1: c t 0, c* □, ct + , with 
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The unit root is difficult to admit for the country that is loosing assets, because 
there shall come a time when total assets decrease below zero, and since consumption 
is a positive multiply of total assets, it becomes negative. It is quite easy to avoid
that feature by introducing a risk premium. Replace (5.3) by
r t  =  — 6 7  A;7 - 1  A:g l - 7 r l + 1
— e (1 — r ) 7 (1 — 7) A:7 - 2  A;g 1 - 7  k { (5-3’)
+  e  ( 1  — t )  7 ( 1  — 7 ) A;7 - 1  A:g _ T  k f — ijj
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i.e. allow for the accumulation of foreign assets to reduce the domestic interest. For 
the foreign country I do the opposite, i.e., a d d  a term ip  jh- i . Simulations show 
that a  ip  as small as 10~8 is sufficient to stabilise foreign assets. To ensure that 
consumption in the slow growing country remains positive, I need a much larger 
figure. For the case of the infrastructure shock of Subsection 6.2, setting ip =  .00003 
ensures that consumption remains positive. Basically such a value suggests that a 
country that has a foreign debt that 10 times its annual GDP would require a risk 
premium of .03%. O f course this is a value that would appear on the low side, but 
all I wish to illustrate here is that I can break the unit root with such a low value 
to a sufficient degree that the resulting consumption in the slow growing country 
remains positive. The corresponding graph for the first 60 periods is given in Figure 
6.17. It is almost the same graph as Figure 6.6, but now the lines for c t and c\ 
are strictly concave. In the limit, the domestic consumption rises by 57.5092%, 
whereas the foreign consumption declines by 57.4792%. The feedback of the interest 
rate on foreign assets ensures differential growth without one country’s consumption 
becoming negative.
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7 The optimal and time-consistent policies for the single 
economy
A t period 0, the economy is in  the steady state of Table 4.1 w ith the values of Table
5.2 found on page 44. These are the long-run values used for the linear-quadratic 
approximation of the model. From period 1 onwards, a maxim ising government 
intervenes. There are several ways in which this assumption can be justified. One 
idea would be that the original steady-state corresponds to an optimum reached 
when preferences were different, i.e. a shift in preferences occured at period 1 . If 
that original steady state would be the outcome of a time-consistent optim isation 
process, another approach to justify to study the optim isation exercise would be to 
imagine that a precommitment mechanism has been found.
Whatever assumption one uses to justify the meximisation, there are two regimes, 
depending on whether or not we allow the government to precommit. If the govern­
ment can precommit, i.e. set a ll values of future instruments in  the current period, 
it  w ill maximise
oo
= (7.1)
t'=l
where ut is given in equation (5.19). When the government cannot precommit itself 
to a future policy, it  must act each period to maximize its welfare function, given 
that a sim ilar optim ization problem w ill be carried out in the next period. Formally, 
the government maximizes at time t > 1 a welfare function Ui such that
Ui = Ui + @Ut+i (7-2)
where Ui+i is evaluated on the assumption that an identical optim ization exercise 
is carried out from time t + 1  onwards. The solution to this problem is found by 
dynam ic programming and, unlike the precommitment policy, leads to a time con­
sistent trajectory or rule for instruments. I label this solution “ST ” , and label the 
precommitment solution “SP ” .
In this section I w ill present a series of graphs that illustrate the results. One 
important presentational issue arises. Since all variables are expressed in  per G D P  
terms, saying that in  one regime per G D P  consumption is smaller than in another 
does not im ply that the actual gross flows of consumption are smaller. It is possible 
that one regime w ill have a smaller consumption to G D P  ratio but allows for a larger 
consumption flow because for a larger growth rate. For a meaningful comparison 
of regimes, it  is therefore important to introduce figures have been “grossed up” 
to reflect the evolution of aggregates, rather than the per-GDP values. P ick  any 
aggregate X  in  the model, and normalize Y ( l)  = 1 . One way to perform the 
calculation of the grossed up variable would be to calculate
t
Xi  =  Xi I J ( 1  +  n +  n t) (7.3)
t'=i
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This would give the evolution of the real aggregate, when the linear-quadratic pol­
icy calculation leads to the sequence of G D P  growth rates (n1,n 2, . ..  ,n t) and the 
series of the per-GDP aggregates is ( x i , x 2, . . .  , x t). However that is not what the 
programme actually computes because the programme calculates a linear quadratic 
approximation of the real aggregate. The “real” aggregate is
X ( t)  =  x (t)  
This approximation is
t-i
na+rc(t'+i))
,i'=i
t' >  1
X t — x t (1 + n y  + x  rq  (1 + n y  2 (7 .4)
In the following I have used this approximation. In each period, this number 
reports a linear approximation of the ratio of the aggregate as a percentage of in ­
come in the original steady-state i.e. the state that would prevail of the government 
would not have changed its policy on any date. It should be noted that considering 
(7.4) rather than (7.3) im p lic itly  introduces a bias towards a slow growing but high 
consum ption/GDP ratio regime, because the former takes no account of the non­
linear nature of economic growth. Th is bias is increased by the incomplete root of 
nb required to circumvent the accumulator problem.
The calculations seek to maximise (5.19), w ith a startup penalty of 10-9 for the 
change of taxes in  the in it ia l period. That penalty is required for the solution of the 
optimal control problem.
Table 7.1 gives long run values for both regimes. In the SP regime, taxation 
increases, whereas in  the ST  regime taxation falls. The long run deviations in  
the tax rate from the in it ia l state are rather small in  both regimes. The impact 
of optim ization on the investment share is much more substantial. In the long 
run, the SP  regime neglects infrastructure investment, the u t ility  in  the long run is 
propped up by government consumption. The SP government w ill have invested into 
infrastructure quite heavily in  the earlier periods, such that as a fraction of G D P  the 
infrastructure stock increases, but the increase is small. The time-consistent po licy 
increases investment in infrastructure in all periods.
Since taxes have fallen the ST  regime allows for greater private consumption 
and private investment in the long run. Under SP the share of consumption and 
investment are reduced. However since the SP regime leads to higher investment in 
the earlier periods, the fa ll in  the capital stock is not as large as in  the ST  regime.
The interest rate remains almost constant under SP, but rises by almost ha lf 
a percentage point under ST. Despite that increase in  the interest rate, the fa ll in  
the desired capital stock is lim ited because there is a tax cut. Under ST  there is a 
fa ll in human wealth through the increase in the interest rate, but the reluctance 
rate £ falls as well such that the overall impact of the time-consistent po licy is 
an increase in  consumption. F ina lly  the most important effect is on the growth 
rate. Whereas under the optimal regime the growth rate falls from 2% to 1.86%, it  
increases under the time-consistent regime under to almost 2.5%. O f course this has
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SP ST
7*00 1.110 -2.913
Too -2.272 8.475
7*00 -0.093 0.486
n  oo -0.140 0.484
ftoo -1.828 - 1.666
CO 1.255 3.648
1.691 -40.823
Go 27.811 -145.851
i>oo -0.473 1.165
gL - 0.100 0.816
Coo -0.637 1.748
SSo 1.211 -3.729
-0.137 -42.490
I  CO -2 .757 9.062
G'oo -1.187 4.573
Coo -9.057 30.852
GCoo -0.722 2.950
F-oo -40.663 132.577
K goo -17.221 67.516
■tffoo -208.536 677.898
-167.873 545.321
t/oo -3429.605 -15225.871
c/i -6995.045 -39419.355
Table 7.1: The long-run percentage deviations
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welfare implications that dwarf the changes in the ind iv idual components of GDP. 
In the longer run, the gross (as opposed to per-GDP) flows of private and public 
consumption w ill be much higher under the ST  regime than under SP. The long 
run equilibrium  of SP displays slow growth and excessive public consumption of the 
kind one could relate to the former communist Eastern B lock countries.
Figure 7.1: r t, SP <0, ST  +,
Figure 7.2: taxes r t, SP 0, ST  +,
Figure 7.1 shows that both regimes increase the investment share of government 
spending in it ia lly  but only ST  keeps the investment effort going, in  SP the share 
of investment in infrastructure in government spending drops below the benchmark 
after 10 years and remains there.
As evident from Figure 7.2, both regimes in it ia lly  cut taxes to crowd in  private 
investment, but only the ST  regime makes the tax cut a permanent one. Both 
regimes also substantially increase government investment spending, but the SP 
regime reverses the investment share to levels below the baseline after about 15 
years.
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Figure 7.3: growth n t, SP  Q, ST  +,
0
Figure 7.4: interest rate r t, SP Q, ST
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Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show effects on growth rates and interest rates. Note that 
Ti\ — 0 for a ll regimes since the growth rate is in it ia lly  predetermined. The optimal 
regime raises the growth rate in it ia lly  quite substantially, but after about 20 years 
all periods that follow are so heavily discounted that growth is no longer worth much 
sacrifice in  the preceding periods, thus growth declines to levels that are below that 
of the in it ia l steady state. Under SP the movement of the interest rate closely 
follows the movement of the growth rate. Under the ST  regime the rate of growth 
increases by almost 1% in the in it ia l periods and is slow to come down to its long 
run change of .484%. In both regimes, the evolution of the interest rate anticipates 
the movement of the growth rate, because the installed capital stocks at the end of 
the period determine the current rates of interest, but the growth rate of the next 
period.
Figure 7.5: Investment i t , SP  0, ST  +,
Figure 7.5 shows the trajectory of investment in  per-GPD  terms. In the first 
period investment falls because of the immediate impact of the interest rate and the 
delay in  the respone of the infrastructure stock. A fter about 15 years, the policy 
of stimulating investment is reversed in the SP regime, investment falls below the 
baseline because of higher taxes and lower infrastructure investment. The long-run 
tax cut in  the ST  regime and the higher stock of infrastructure allows for investment 
to remain above the baseline.
Figure 7.6 shows private consumption. The comparison of the two regimes is 
sim ilar to the case of investment. The fa ll of consumption below the baseline in  SP 
appears already after about eight years, because consumption is forward-looking. 
Figure 7.7 illustrates that the rise of the reluctance rate over and above the baseline 
occurs in  period 5 , even before the consumption is reversed under SP. The long-run 
increase in  taxes dominate the short-run effect of higher private wealth from period 
5 onwards. In the ST  regime the reluctance rate falls permanently. Despite a fa ll 
in private wealth, according to Figure 7.6 the overall result is a rise in consumption 
because there is a rise in consumption.
The long-run benefts of continued investment in  infrastructure, combined w ith
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Figure 7.6: Consumption Ct, SP 0, ST  -j-,
Figure 7.7: reluctance rate £t, SP 0, ST  +,
Figure 7.8: wealth SP 0, ST +,
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a cut in taxes, comes at the price of reduced government consumption. Figure 
7.9 shows the drop, but later fu ll recovery of public consumption under SP and 
the partia l recovery under ST. It is instructive to look at a diagram of aggregate 
government consumption using the approximation (7.4). Th is is displayed in  Figure 
7.10. It suggests that whereas the aggregate public consumption remains higher in  
the SP regime even in the long run— there is no free lunch in the time-consistent 
regime— the difference is only small in the long run, when one considers that growth 
is much larger in the ST  regime.
To sum up the trajectories of policies, we can say that both policies are very 
sim ilar at the very beginning. Most aggregates for ST  show a substantial change 
in the in it ia l period that is later very partia lly  reversed. A lthough in the case of 
the SP policy the in it ia l change of an aggregate is sim ilar to the ST  regime, a shift 
of policy occurs after about 10 periods and a reversal of the sign of most changes 
occurs around that time.
The last two rows give figures for the welfare losses. Here TJ^ is the welfare 
loss on the steady state and U\ is the cost-to-go, i.e. the welfare loss from the first 
period to the infinite future. It is worth noticing that the steady-state welfare loss 
as computed by the progamme is larger under ST  than under SC. I am not sure 
as to why that is the case. C learly the ST regime appears to be better in the long 
run. Th is can be shown when we use the real value of utilty, as opposed to the 
steady-state approximation that is U<x>. Consider the u tility  function as
t'=o
when in  the steady state we have
+  7?
1 — cr 1 — cr
(7.5)
C( t) = c (1 + n ){ and G \t)  = gc( l  + n )1 (7.6)
Provided that q (1 + n ) l ~G <  l 20 u tility  in the steady state is given by
u =  I  (7,7)
l - e a + n ) 1- "  l  — i7 V ’
One can the find the growth equivalent of a change from the baseline of Table 4.1 to 
the long run of ST  as .49%, whereas a change to the steady state from the baseline 
to the the SP steady state is equivalent to an exogenous fa ll of around .14% in  the 
growth rate. The change in welfare in the steady state is thus important, although 
adm itting ly not spectacular.
Another exercise that can be performed on the computer is the calculation of the 
optimal steady state policy. That is the solution to the optim isation problem faced 
by a hypothetical policymaker that could choose between different steady states. 
Numerical simulations show that such a policymaker would choose r  = 33% and 
r = 50%. Thus the taxation in  both regimes is s t ill way off the value that would 
maximise steady-state welfare.
20Barro (1990) and Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) have the same condition. It is of course 
verified in my calibration.
68
Figure 7.9: public consumption gf, SP 0, ST  +,
Figure 7.10: public consumption SP 0, ST  +,
How sensitive are the results to the calibration? To answer that question I have 
collected evidence on the long-run values of the model under alternative assumptions 
about some of the underlying parameters in Table 7.2. In the first two columns there 
are figures for regimes SP and ST when the elasticity of substitutions has increased 
up to close to one. The results appear qualitatively the same as the results under 
1 /a  =  .5, but the absolute values of the changes are much larger. The only exception 
is £oo) but this term is d irectly affected by the change in  a.
One suspected cause for the suboptimality of the SP regime is the discounting 
of the periods that are far away in the future. In columns 3 and 4 of the Table
7.2 I examine the case where a  — 0. Indeed the results of the simulations in  the 
optimal regime show much smaller deviations from the steady-state. The decline 
in  r  is much less dramatic and therefore the long run growth rate shows almost no 
decline. C learly the SP government that does not discount is more concerned about 
the long term. But so is the ST  government, and as I show in  Table 7.2, the strategy 
that is fam iliar from the central calibration is intensified. The tax cut is deeper and
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0 = 1.01 A = 0 7  = .9208
SP ST SP ST SP ST
7~co 2.70 -12.06 0.26 -9 .64 -6 .83 -5 .54
Too -9 .65 30.96 -0.11 23.17 8.53 2.27
T’oo -0 .44 1.28 0.00 1.12 0.69 0.45
77*00 -0 .55 1.80 -0.01 0.99 0.92 0.70
£00 10.50 -30.48 -4 .77 -1368.60 -206.91 -136.30
I<x> -573.69 1869.88 - 0.20 13.50 10.51 8.14
G'oo -217.96 708.66 0.03 5.54 3.065 1.25
Coo -1564.28 5097.05 -0 .38 34.72 32.13 24.48
C coo -381.60 1240.92 0.11 -4 .31 0.22 0.844
F-OO -9721.95 31687.53 - 2.86 174.15 137.98 107.61
K lo -3693.72 12009.12 0.639 73.32 32.54 6.66
-67707.15 220614.61 -19.35 793.22 538.94 421.88
W oo -77429.10 252302.14 - 22.20 967.37 676.92 529.49
Table 7.2: Sensitivity of model
the infrastructure expenditure is more important, such that the capital stocks more 
rap id ly and bring more benefits in the later periods. Therefore the basic qualitative 
features of the comparison between the regimes remains the same.
In the last column I examine an alternative assumption for the parameter 7 . I 
use the value that would be the optimum in  the original Barro (1990) model. In 
his model, the optimum is time consistent since by assumption taxes do not change 
over time. In addition, there is no transitional dynamics since the infrastructure 
stock is assumed to completely depreciate. He then computes the optimal tax rate 
as r  =  (1 — 7 ) /r. Since this value is achieved w ith fu ll depreciation, we expect 
the optimal level of infrastructure to be lower.21 Thus here we are in a situation 
where the in it ia l steady state overinvests in  public infrastructure. In this case the SP 
and ST  regimes ressemble each other, they both involve a tax cut but an increase 
in the fraction spent on infrastructure in the long run. In the short run the SP 
government can use the existing overaccumulated capital stock to satisfy the need 
for current rather than future consumption implied by discounting. Both  government 
consumption and investment fa ll as a ratio of G D P  in both regimes.
I would qualify this latter case, where government capital stock is too large to 
begin with, as an irregular one. The absence of any criterion to select between 
historic steady states from which to start the model is an obvious problem for any 
dynamic model. If the starting point of the model is in  the very early days when 
government first is created, it  would be natural to assume that the infrastructure 
stock is too small rather than too large. If we pick the starting point along the 
trajectory of an SP government we know that overaccumulation of infrastructure is 
not relevant since this regime underaccumulates infrastructure in  the long run. If we
21 See Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) for a discussion of this aspect.
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pick the starting point along the trajectory of an ST  government, the reoptim isation 
w ill not change the trajectory of the government’s policy. That follows from the 
definition of the time-consistent equilibrium. Bu t it goes w ithout saying that if  the 
policy before the first period is irrational then clearly anything could have happened, 
including overaccumulation of government capital.
The conclusion that the time-consistent regime may fare much better in the 
longer ran should be contrasted w ith the received wisdom regarding the time- 
consistency issue. For example Zee (1994), writes (page 132)
The present paper takes the position that the time-inconsistency prob­
lem is worth preventing, because on a practical level its presence would 
cast doubt on the desirability of implementing governments announced 
policies and on a conceptual level it  would rob much of the substantive 
content in most dynamic optim ization exercises that are routinely carried 
out in many areas of economic research.
I show that in the absence of debt the time-consistent solution has desirable prop­
erties in the long ran, most im portantly that it generates higher growth for a wide 
range of parameters. Thus the issue of time inconsistency is important in models of 
endogenous growth.
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In Section 6 I used a linear approximation of the model to show that w ithout a 
reaction to policy in the foreign country, a change of policy in the domestic country 
may leave the foreign country to accumulate foreign debt, up to the point where 
consumption becomes negative and the u tility  derived from it  becomes undefined. 
C learly any meaningful equilibrium  in  this model requires symmetry in policy. In 
a model w ith identical countries, the outcome is inevitably symmetric. From the 
analytical literature I described in Subsection 2.5 on page 21, it  should be expected 
that the spillover effects for symmetric calibrations are much smaller. In fact that 
is confirmed by the results in Table 8.1. It lists long run deviations from the steady 
state for three regimes. T P  is the two-country cooperative pre-commitment regime. 
Th is regime produce results that are very close to the ones for the SP regime of 
Section 7 .22 T C  is the cooperative non-reputational regime. T N  is the regime w ith-
8 Cooperation versus non-cooperation
T P T C T N
Too -0.095 0.486 0.462
TL0o -0.142 0.484 0.440
koo -1.821 - 1.666 -2 .483
*S> 1.239 - 1.666 -2 .479
“too 1.809 -40.823 -41.407
£oo 27.860 -145.851 -138.773
roo -2.308 8.475 7.784
Too 1.123 -2.913 -2.538
ioo 0.478 1.165 1.003
9h -0.104 0.816 0.799
Coo -0.633 1.748 1.551
9%o 1.226 -3.729 -3.337
^oo 0.099 -42.490 -43.500
Ux -6971.925 -39419.355 -31915.615
Table 8.1: Long run values of cooperative and Nash regimes
out cooperation and w ithout reputation. Details of solution procedures are found 
in Appendix B. Note that there are no values for the regime w ith reputation but 
without cooperation. This is simply because the A C E S  software does not compute 
that case. Table 8.1 contains the long run results for the regimes. The cost-to-go 
U\ of the cooperative regime is higher than the cost-to-go of the non-cooperative 
regime. Thus we appear to be in a situation where coordination does not pay. How­
ever on inspection of the values the cooperative regime seems to fare better in  a ll
22In fact there should be no difference in the two regimes. However the ACES software insists 
on diverging into asymmetric solutions cooperative reputational regime. I suspect that there is a 
bug in the software for this particular regime. The workaround that problem was to set jii =  0, V t. 
Still with this constraints, some price changes still occur that make for a small divergence. The 
results presented here are the ones for the domestic country.
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Figure 8.1 : r t, T C  <>? T N  □, T P  +,
Figure 8.2: rt, TC 0, TN □, TP +,
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areas but government consumption. Using (7.7), I find that the welfare improve­
ment of the steady state of T N  from the baseline is a growth equivalent of .442%. 
Th is is smaller than the .486% growth equivalent that a transition to the steady 
state of T C  is equivalent to. Thus in the long run, cooperation is welfare improving, 
but not along the trajectory. Cooperation improves long-run welfare through lower 
taxation, higher public infrastructure, a larger capital stock and higher growth. The 
only component of welfare where the long run of T C  is weaker is public consumption. 
In this respect the comparison between the long run of T C  and T N  is quite sim ilar 
to the comparison between between ST  and SP. Both ST  and T C  depress public 
consumption and fare better in the longer run at the expense of lower fe lic ity in  the 
first periods.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the changes in the tax rate. For technical reasons that 
are linked to the state-space representation, the in it ia l tax rate is predetermined,
i.e. the tax rates is only allowed to vary from period 2 onwards. A l l  regimes in it ia lly  
lower taxes, but the time-consistent regimes lower taxes by more and the tax cut 
is persistent. Taxes rates reach a m inimum in  period 5 for T C  and period 6 for 
T N  after which they slowly rise, but remain over 2% lower than the baseline. The 
non-cooperative regime decreases taxes by a smaller amount than the cooperative 
regime. The fiscal policies of both regimes converge over time, but a small gap 
remains even in  the long run. The T P  regime contrasts sharply, the fa ll in taxation 
is reversed as early as the second period, and by about 10 periods, the in it ia l cut in 
taxation becomes a tax hike.
Figure 8.3: gf, T C  *—> 0, T N  □, T P  «—* +,
Figure 8.2 illustrates that the cooperative regime overinvests more heavily in 
public infrastructure than the Nash regime, but not by much if  we take the distance 
w ith the T P  regime as a benchmark. The difference between the two time-consistent 
regimes tends to decline, after 60 periods it  is only 2/3 of what it  is in  the first period, 
but the difference does not vanish. A l l  regimes show an in it ia l increase in  infrastruc­
ture expenditure. The time-consistent regimes keep infrastructure spending up in 
the long run, but the optimal regime T P  looses interest in  public infrastructure. A f-
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ter about 10 periods the infrastructure spending proportion drops below the baseline 
and remains there.
Figure 8.4: g\, T C  0, T N  □, T P  +,
The consequences of these policies for the government’s consumption and in­
vestment are pictured in 8.3 and 8.4. The time-consistent regimes in ita lly  lower 
government consumption, it recovers immediately but remains substantially below 
the baseline, dropping from 14% to just over 10%. The time-consistent regimes w ill 
cut goverment consumption to enable both a drop in taxes that w ill crowd in  p ri­
vate investment, as well as an increase in  the share of public investment in  public 
expenditure to support public investment. Th is allows for higher growth perfor­
mance. The T P  regime in it ia lly  cuts government consumption but then reverses 
the policy and after 10 periods has increased government consumption above the 
baseline. Clearly this policy is not time-consistent, since if  the government where to 
reoptimise in these later periods it  would face a very sim ilar incentive to decrease 
government consumption.
The graph on the level of public investment in the Figure 8.4 shows that, the 
first few periods apart the public investment share is the v irtua lly  the same in both 
the cooperative and non-cooperative regime. This is an interesting result. I al­
ready explained on page 21 that Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) show w ith in  their 
model that the level of public investment would be coordiated efficiently, i.e., that 
any Nash equilibrium would reach public investment shares that a central planner 
would choose. M y  simulations suggest that this result is approximately true in a 
dynamic setting w ith time-consistent policy making. The difference between the 
regimes lies in how the change in government investment is achieved, i.e. which is 
the m ix of the two primary variables. The cooperative solution is to invest rela­
tive ly more heavily and drive the tax rate lower. The non-cooperative strategy is 
to keep taxes relatively higher and the share r t relatively lower. This is the main 
difference between the regimes. The reason for that is intu itive ly clear. The govern­
ment consumption in  each country generates felicity for the domestic consumer only. 
Therefore a government interested in the domestic welfare only w ill spend more on
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public consumption than would be desirable from a cooperative time consistent po li­
cymakers point of view. That said, we should not loose sight of the optimum policy. 
A lthough the cooperative policy is better in  the long run, it  drives the economy 
further away from the time-inconsistent optimal path. The non-cooperative policy 
also delivers a lower “cost-to-go” , that is a lower value for u tility  measured at the 
starting date. Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show that the lower taxes of the T C  regime result 
in both higher consumption and higher investment by the private sector. Both  se­
ries remain quite close though and converge over time, leaving only room for small 
differences in the long run. It is interesting to see how the private sector reacts to 
the changes on government po licy under TP. Since the current tax rate is predeter­
mined, we have r x = 0, then t 2 < 0, but from then onwards taxes rise and from 
time 14 onward r t > 0, V t  > 14. The shift in the infrastructure expenditure from 
supporting infrastructure to neglecting it occurs in period 15. The time profile of 
the reaction of the private sector is much smoother then the policy set by the gov­
ernment. Consumption rises im m ed ia te ly  but returns below the baseline in period 
8, well before the reversal in  the government’s policy, which indicates how important 
the forward-looking component of consumption is.
Figure 8.5: ct, T C  0, T N  □, T P  +,
Investment has no forward-looking component, it  only depends on next periods’ 
taxes and the current capital stock. In the in it ia l period under a ll regimes, invest­
ment falls. W ith  rising taxation and constant taxes and growth, there is no room 
in the national expenditure for investment to rise or remain constant. In the time- 
consistent regime, there is a sustained rise in  private investment in the periods that 
follow. In the inconsistent T P  regime, an in it ia l increase in period 2 is reduced over 
time. However investment only drops below the baseline at period 18, that is after 
the policy reversal by the government but before the growth rate falls below the 
baseline. Thus investment reacts w ith a lag to policy developments.
From the evolution of both private and public investment, we can d irectly derive 
the evolution of the corresponding capital stocks. They are pictured in  Figure 8.7 
and Figure 8.8 respectively. The private capital stock falls in a ll regimes. That seems
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Figure 8.6: i t, T C  0, T N  n t T P  +,
surprising at first, since Figure 8.6 and 8.4 both suggest increases in investment in 
the first periods. However there is no conflict between these results because there 
is an increase in the growth rate. From (5.3) and (5.5) when there is increase in 
the growth rate, the capital stocks ceteris paribus decline. There is a net shift in 
the composition of capital from private to public in all regimes; i.e. the G D P  share 
of private capital declines and the share of public capital increases. The shift is 
stronger for the cooperative regime than for the Nash regime. In the T P  regime, 
the private capital stock per G D P  does not fa ll by as much, but in absolute values 
it  falls by more than in the time-consistent regimes, because of the weak rates of 
growth. On the other hand, the figures for the time-consistent regime underestimate 
the capital stock in  these regimes because the rate of growth is higher. Consider
Figure 8.7: k{, T C  Q, T N  □, T P  +,
finally the growth rates and interest rates. In the cooperative regime, growth is 
higher than in  the Nash regime because of the higher infrastructure accumulation 
and lower taxes. Both time-consistent regimes contrast sharply w ith the optimal
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Figure 8.8: Af, T C  <—> 0, T N  □, T P
regime. In the second period, growth is larger in  T P  then in the time-consistent 
regimes, but from period 4 onwards, growth is slower. Growth returns below the 
baseline in period 19, and remains there. W ith  a 2% baseline, growth is s t ill positive 
in the long run, but even a small difference in the long run growth has of course 
very im portant implications on long run welfare.
Figure 8.9: n t, T C  0, T N  □, T P  +,
To summarize, the cooperative time-consistent solution amplifies the difference 
between the time-consistent and precomitment solution, but not by much. Cooper­
ation is therefore welfare improving in the long run but not on the trajectory.
From the numeric example it should not be concluded that the d istinction be­
tween optim al and time-consistent regime has more impact on welfare than the 
distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal policies. F irs t recall that 
we do not have values for the non-cooperative reputational regime, and we would 
need that figure since it  may matter a lot under precommitment if  the solution is 
cooperative or not. There is also a problem w ith the sensitivity of the results. From
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Figure 8.10: r t, T C  0, T N  n } T P  +,
Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) we know that the crucial parameter is the elas­
tic ity  of substitution 1/a. They also present simulation evidence suggesting that 
the m inimum externality between policies in different countries can be found at 
< j^ 2. Th is is of course the central value for the calibration in  this model. It should 
therefore come as no surprise that the difference between the cooperative and the 
non-cooperative regime is small. I have tried to extent the range of a. Bu t A C E S  
simulations for the T N  regime do not work when a  is outside the set [1.8, 2.3]. For 
values at the margins of that set, there is a large divergence in the values of the long 
run equilibria. By  that I mean that the results are not symmetric, one country is 
accumulating assets over the other. Th is should not be the case since the outcome 
of a symmetric model should be symmetric.
There are two possible explanations for this outcome. One is that the algorithm 
to compute the solution is correct, but it  does not work in this case. Next to 
nothing is known about the convergence properties of the algorithm. I suspect that 
the unit root in foreign assets leads to a divergent evolution. The simulation for 
the first country, leads to a path in  which it  accumulates so many assets that w ith  
given that path, the optimal response of the second government is to accommodate 
this process. From such an in it ia l situation the algorithm is not likely to converge 
at all, let alone to a symmetric outcome across countries. There is considerable 
experimental support for this conjecture. When I replace foreign assets by a variable 
that is always 0, I do find result for the T N  regime as soon as a > 1.
The problem of non-convergence also affects the TC , the cooperative regime. One 
would be more comfortable w ith  forcing foreign assets to zero for that regime. One 
possible way out would be therefore to compare two regimes where we artific ia lly  
annul-ate the foreign asset accumulation, and hope that the results we have are not 
too far off the true ones. Unfortunately simulations show that the annulation of 
foreign assets implies a bias on the results. It changes the comparison of the results, 
cooperation reduces growth rather than increasing it.
To conclude, in this section I have emphasised the comparison between a coop-
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erative and a non-cooperative equilibrium w ith time consistent policy. I find that 
cooperation increases growth. It pushes to the economy further towards the high- 
growth, low taxation bias that features prominently in the time-consistent case.
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9 Debt
Up until now I have assumed that the government budget is in equilibrium  at all 
times. There have only been two policy instruments, global expenditure and the 
fraction of expenditure spent on infrastructure. Taxes are equal to government 
spending in these earlier models.
I now enlarge the model to allow taxes to diverge from government spending. 
Th is implies the introduction of government debt. The easiest approach to debt is 
treating it  as composed of one-period government bonds. I introduce end-of-period 
debt as £ (t)  and return to the single-country version of the model. Since domestic 
debt is held by domestic consumers, equation (3.3) becomes
iZ?(t) = tf(t)  + JZ(t) + £(t) (3.3')
The government budget constraint (3.30) becomes
B (t)  = <?(t) -  r(t) Q {t) + (1 + r ( t  -  1)) £ ( t  -  1) (3.30')
I f government expenditure is not bound by a budget constraint— imagine that 
B (t)  would be free— then the optimal government expenditure is not finite. There­
fore we need an additional constraint on government. The most common constraint 
is solvency, i.e., that the present value of government expenditure minus the present 
value of its income must be equal to the negative of government debt. The idea 
is that the tax revenue must be sufficient to both finance expenditure and pay off 
government debt. Seen in this way, government debt is a predetermined variable 
that has been determined by the past. In each period the government must respect 
its budget constraint.
W ith in  the state-space representation of the model it is very difficult to force the 
government to respect the budget constraint. One can treat debt as a predetermined 
variable, the evolution of which is given by
, 1 + r  , b (1 +  r )b
bi = — —  &t- i  + 7 —  n - 1 -  7— -7  rii +  g t -  n  (9.1)
1 + n 1 + ri (1 + n )2
However there is no recipe to ensure government solvency. A  simple approach is 
to penalise the accumulation of debt w ith in  the target of the government, i.e., add 
a term like Vf, b\. Unfortunately, under optimal control, the model w ith debt does 
not converge unless both changes in debt and changes in the tax rate are subject
to stabilisation penalties v&& and v&T respectively. The time-consistent regime also
requests an additional stabilisation penalty on the level of debt Vf,. A  problem arises 
because an arb itrary choice of numbers for both parameters w ill im ply that the 
government w ill choose the financial structure of its assets so as to m inim ize the 
penalty associated w ith changes in debt and taxation.
One approach is to depart from a neutrality relationship between the parameters. 
I can lin k  the parameters in such a way that various financing options w ill become 
equivalent as far as the imposition of penalties is concerned. Consider the three 
following scenarios that a ll allow to raise one unit of funds:
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Po licy 1 : raise tax this period 
Penalty: (1 + q) vAt
Th is financing option implies changing the tax twice, but no accumulation of 
debt.
Po licy 2: raise debt, pay back next period
Penalty: (g + g2) (1 + r )2/ (1 + n )2 vAt + (1 + g) v Ab + vb
Th is financing option implies no penalty on changing taxes in  the first period, 
but in  the two subsequent periods. In addition there is the penalty of changing and 
holding debt.
Po licy 3: raise debt, raise taxes in a ll period to serve it 
Penalty: g (r  -  n )2/ (1 + n )2 vAr + vAb + 1/(1 -  g) vb
If I assume that all these policies im ply a loss v, I can deduct
t,Ar =  ^  (9-2)
t* = { l ± r ^ - s ) v  (g 3)
( n - r ) ( ( l  + n) + e ( l  + r ) )u  , .
= ----------(1 + n )2 ( l + e)---------- (9'4)
The problem w ith this specification is that the v term must be set quite high for 
the programme to converge. After experimentation I chose v  = 200. Below that the 
solution, particu larly in the time-consistent regime, exhibits growing fluctuations; 
they become divergent when the penalty goes below 100, and at about 70 the time 
consistent procedures does no longer converge, and the R ica tt i equation for the 
optimal control solution can no longer be solved.
If v — 200, the solution is not interesting, since the debt is so heavily penalised 
that the po licy is almost balanced budget. Thus I have not included a further 
discussion of these results here.
The problem w ith th is approach of a pre-determined government debt is that 
is neglects the question of solvency. The debt held by the private sector w ill be 
paid off over time by taxes levied on the same private sector. Whereas here the 
private sector includes bonds in its wealth, it  does not include the present value 
of the repayments. Th is is clearly incompatible w ith the basic idea of a rational 
expectations equilibrium.
A n  alternative view would be to neglect the detail of how government debt is 
managed and to start w ith the idea that the private sector own the net worth of 
the public sector. The net worth of the public sector is the discounted sum of all 
primary deficits or surpluses from the current period to the infinite future. The net 
worth is equal to the value of debt if  the government is solvent. Therefore I w ill 
confuse the notation of the net worth of the government and the stock of bonds, to 
write
“  r(t) <?(t) -  G(t) '
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where B ( t — 1) is the net worth o f the public sector, which, when the solvency 
condition holds, is equal to the debt contracted. Define the growth rate between  
between time t and time ti
n t(t ') =  m ax ( t l i 1 +  K O )  ~  1 »1 j 
then in p e r -G D P  terms (9.5) is
^ ) = e Y ^ t ? <«“ >
where I define the prim ary surplus as d(t) =  r ( t )  — g(i). I linearise (9.6) around  
b =  d =  0 as
-< , \ t'-i+i1 +
t'=t
^  =  *  (9.7)
or in first difference:
1 + n. . .
— —  bt -  bt- i  + g t - r t (9.8)
1 +  r
which is the equation I enter into the software, with 6t- i  as a  free variable. Since
wealth includes the stock of debt, the target (5.19) takes proper account o f the
debt.23
23Well, almost. There appears a linear term
(1 +  r) &t-i
(l +  £) (1+n)
This term can be more precise by using the quadratic expansion of &t_i. Since d — 0, the only 
intervening terms are the crossed terms between the interest and growth rates and the surpluses. 
I  will demonstrate the case of the interaction between growth rates and interest rates. Again, let 
bt-i be the second-order approximation, I  have
I u _  ST' (1 +  n)1 j y"' (l +  n)t+1J
1 1 “  As (l +  r)t,+i t+l'nH-c Y  _|_ r)t'+2 “t+t/ rt+t'
Drawing heavily on equation (4.12), it can be shown that
oo ^ co
[&t+t' — — -r——  Y] (^ +
t'=0 n t'=0
1 00 — 7“—  Ql (ti + 1)
1 + r tf=0
This is the quadratic expansion of the net worth of the public sector for the crossed terms in 
growth. In any period, the quadratic approximation of the intertemporal target will take account 
of all future expressions of this sum. The sequence of terms {(ti +  1 ) &i-i+t'}?Lo can not he fitted 
into the state-space representation. An approximation of the sequence would be
6? = b\_ 1 + 61 (9.9)
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Let us sum up. M y  approach is to include the asset position of the public sector 
as part of the wealth of the private sector. Th is approach is equivalent to including 
debt as long as the government is solvent; however its state-space representation 
is quite different, because the net worth of the public sector is a forward-looking 
variable.
Treating debt as a non-predetermined variable is of course a controversial as­
sumption. From a mathematical viewpoint, this is nothing else then stating the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government. From an economic point of 
view, it simply expresses that the public own the government and therefore its asset 
position.
The solvency concept used here completely abstracts from the institu tional as­
pects of solvency. It is not based on any assumption about a long-run value of the 
government. If the government balances it budget in every period, then its value is 
zero. If it  does not then since it is owned by the private sector, the private sector 
w ill, under rational expectations, take account of the value of the state. The value of 
the state is the discounted sum of the future income minus the future expenditure. 
I w ill refer to this concept of solvency as an equity concept of solvency, and the 
forward looking discounted sum of all future net income stream as the public equity.
There are other concept of solvency, and each brings in  an additional level of 
constraint that. In most cases, researchers require that the public equity w ill be 
equal to a certain predetermined sum in  each period, usually this sum is taken to be 
zero. One justification is the idea the debt is financed through some debt instrument. 
In itia lly  the debt takes a predetermined value. The government can only raise the 
revenue by raising taxation or selling further debt. I w ill call this concept the debt 
concept of solvency. The problem w ith the debt concept is that it is d ifficult to 
implement in  a linear-quadratic framework.
There are some refinements of the debt concept of solvency on the market. One 
is to require that the deb t/G D P  ratio must be a stable. The advantage of that 
refinement is that is easy to achieve w ith in the linear quadratic framework; it  suffices 
to penalise debt. Another concept is that debt should be zero in the long run. Th is
This alternative term covers the same number of b terms in every period, but not the time profile 
of these terms. The approximation has the awkward problem that it relies on bv — 0, V t' <  t. The 
relaxation of the budget constraint in each period to a unique solvency constraint for all period 
must come as a surprise to the private sector when optimisation starts. For the interest rate, the 
calculation of a square approximation is equivalent.
To improve the approximation, I could therefore include in the target the quadratic approxima­
tion of 6f  This approximation can in turn be approximated using the sum of primary surpluses. 
The additional term in (5.19) are
- ' ( 1  +r) „ ,b
(X + f) (1 + ») r‘"16l_1 (1 +€)(! + ")2 i 'l_1
Within ACES, the introduction of a term like b\ requires &oo =  0 because of the accumulator effect. 
Thus the strict definition enforces a balanced primary budget and therefore zero public debt. Again 
I circumvent that feature of the solution by setting the root in (9.9) to 0.99. Unfortunately the 
introduction of these terms does not give plausible results. All following calculations have been 
made without them.
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is most often used in finite horizon models, there is no justification for it  here.
9.1 T h e  re su lts
The results presented here were calculated for a penalty on the change of government 
spending and on changes of taxation to the tune of 10~13 each. Below that value, the 
calculations for the optimal regime do not converge. For the time-consistent regime 
it is possible to pick a penalty value as small as 10~109, but the results presented 
here adopt the same penalty as the optimal regime. Thus any difference between 
the regimes can not be traced back to different startup penalties. It should however 
be noted that the time-consistent regime does not converge before 106 iterations. It 
may converge after that but I do not have any evidence at hand. The results here 
are for 10000 iterations, i.e. the programme calculates 10000 times the next best 
strategy and then stops, applying the last matrix set that it has found. The results 
for this regime should therefore be treated w ith caution. The optimal and time- 
consistent regimes are labelled D P  and D T , respectively They are single-country, 
closed-economy simulations.
The long-run results are summarized in Table 9.1. They offer a surprising con­
trast w ith the picture that I presented for the balanced-budget regimes. In many 
ways, the introduction of debt reverses the earlier results. Taxation in it ia lly  falls, 
rather than rises, in  both regimes but more so in D P  rather than in  DT. The D P  
government raises the fraction spent on infrastructure almost to the level that would 
maximise the steady-state welfare; see the discussion on page 68. Government spend­
ing rises under D T , but it  falls under D P  in the long run. Higher government invest­
ment makes for higher growth in  the D P  regime as compared to the D T  regime. On 
the other hand, government consumption decreases in DP, but rises in DT. A l l  this 
is quite different from the SP and ST, in  fact the comparison appears to be the op­
posite. It suggests that the results that we found in Section 7 are highly dependent 
on the inab ility  of governments to raise debt. If it  is possible for the precommiting 
government to raise liab ilities, then it  w ill follow a policy that brings it  quite close 
to the policy of the optimal steady state as far as investment is concerned.
The most important aspect to observe here is what I would loosely refer to as the 
“de Silhouette” property, that is that the value of the state, both in  the long run and 
in the short run is negative. That is, the public, if  given a choice, would rather forgo 
the liab ilities of the state. In a conventional model that where government debt is 
predetermined, there w ill be negative debt in the longer run. In this model, there 
w ill be a higher expenditure than income of the state, which is only be possible if  the 
starting debt is negative. Both  approaches are based on the same evolution of debt, 
but the level of debt is either fixed by a term inal condition or a in it ia l condition.
Note that under the debt concept of solvency, the in it ia l debt would be fixed, 
and there would be a long-run trend towards negative debt. The profile under 
time inconsistent policies would to raise taxes a lot in the in it ia l periods, and later 
relax the tight fiscal policy w ithout bringing about positive debt. Under the time- 
consistent policy the in it ia l rise in the tax levels would be smaller but the long-run
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D P D T SP ST
boo -62.95 -82.00
Too -6.384 -2.648 1.110 -2.913
roo 15.482 2.245 -2.272 8.475
c^c 1.152 0.288 -0.093 0.486
n>oo 1.103 0.920 -0.140 0.484
ftoo -5.994 4.108 -1.828 - 1.666
ftgCO 10.508 -0.341 1.255 3.648
-102.640 -66.542 1.691 -40.823
Coo -346.011 -170.696 27.811 -145.851
7oo 2.526 2.644 -0.473 1.165
9oo 1.988 1.123 - 0.100 0.816
Coo 1.413 -4.390 -0.637 1.748
9CoO -5.927 0.624 1.211 -3.729
™>oo -169.139 -199.759 -0.137 -42.490
loo 20.520 17.657 -2.757 9.062
G loo 10.548 8.265 -1.187 4.573
Coo 67.729 50.941 -9.057 30.852
Gcoo 9.292 13.322 -0.722 2.950
Koo 299.895 259.327 -40.663 132.577
K lo 156.039 121.083 -17.221 67.516
Woo -169.139 - 210.012 -208.536 677.898
1232.952 1038.717 -167.873 545.321
Table 9.1: The long run percentage deviations
tax cut would be deeper.
As illustrated in  Figure 9.1 the D T  regime requires a larger in it ia l surplus, (it 
generates a larger income/expenditure gap), however the gap reduces over time and 
after nine periods, it  is smaller than the debt under the precommitment regime. 
However in  the long run the liab ilities of the D P  government are smaller than the 
ones of the D T  regime.
For government spending, Figure 9.2 suggests an important increase in  spending 
in the earlier periods, followed by a decline. From Figure 9.3, the in it ia l rise in  
spending favours government infrastructure rather than consumption, both regimes 
implement an infrastructure boom. Note however that government consumption also 
increases. I suppose this policy is used to counterbalance the effect of the liab ilities 
shock on welfare.
In tax policy, the difference between the two regimes is probably the strongest. 
As illustrated in Figure 9.4 taxation decreases in both regimes but in the D P  regime 
later reverses that policy. There is a trade-off between stimulating public investment 
(high spending) and private investment (low taxes). Increasing liab ilities is a short- 
run solution to that problem, but if  these liab ilities are build ing up, then there is a
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Figure 9.1: frt-i? D P  0, D T  +,
0 10 20 30 40 50 years
Figure 9.2: spending gi, DP 0 ? CT +,
negative impact on welfare through the wealth effect that this represents. Therefore 
in the longer run, the D P  government wishes to improve the asset position in  periods 
where the impact that rising taxes and falling spending has on welfare is already 
heavily discounted. This implies a change in tax policy at period 20. From  that 
period onwards, the impact of further expansionist policies on the economy have less 
positive impact in the future than negative impact in the present. Th is intertemporal 
trade-off implies that that model is stable for an optimal policy. The reversal of 
policy is of course not time-consistent.
Figure 9.3: r (, D P  0, C T  +,
Figure 9.4: taxes rt, DP 0, CT +,
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Figure 9.5: growth n t , D P  0 , D T  +,
Figure 9.6: interest rate r t, SP 0 , ST
0 10 20 30 40 50 years
Figure 9.7: Investment fr, DP 0, DT +,
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Figure 9.8: consumption ct, D P  «—* 0, C T  +,
Figure 9.9: public consumption DP 0, CT +,
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10 Conclusions
• in a model of endogenous growth driven by the accumulation of private and 
public capital, the long-run welfare is likely to be higher under time-consistent 
control,
• cooperative control leads to an increase in long-run welfare (when compared 
to non-cooperative control) through the same approach as the time-consistent 
control leads to a long-run welfare increase over the time-inconsistent control,
• the increase in long-run welfare of time-consistency and cooperation come at 
the expense of losses in  the cost-to-go
• debt leads to the de Silhouette outcome under the “normal” definitions of 
solvency.
Let me briefly comment on some issues that surface at several places in  this 
thesis. F irst consider the theme of endogenous growth. According to some observers 
the endogenous growth literature is a kind of second b irth  to macroeconomics, an 
approach that allows economists to examine the long-run growth of the economy 
and the factors that might affect it. We have shown here that the way we operate 
the public decision making process has significant implications on the growth rate. 
Th is is a fine example on how the short run and the long run are interrelated and 
can be simultaneously analysed. There is no longer a de vision between the two, nor 
is there any fixed long-run scenario the short run would needs to converge to etc. 
Both  are solved jointly, w ith the assumption of rational expectation making the link  
between the two. From an intellectual point of view this is very satisfying. In many 
ways the solvency concept used in Section 9 is ideally suited to this concept since it 
d irectly integrates the long run consequence of debt into the current consumption 
function, rather than fixing it  to an arb itrary predetermined in it ia l level.
A  second important issue is the measurement of social welfare when a time 
consistency problem arises. Underlying the point that the long-run of the time- 
consistent is likely to be lead to higher welfare, the whole ethos of optim isation 
exercises that are conducted in  conventional models— where the time consistency 
problem is usually assumed away. Clearly in  this model there is nothing that makes 
the in it ia lly  optimum defensible once the first period is over. Th is is fundamental 
critique of the conventional optimal control approach to economic policy.
Another interesting angle of this thesis has been the unit root. We show that a 
simple standard formulation of demand leads to a equilibrium interest rate where 
assets accumulate as a unit root. There has been a lot of debate on unit roots in 
the econometric literature, but I am not aware of anyone who would have given a 
theoretical model where unit roots appear. The theme of the unit root runs through 
the sections. It appears first in Section 4 where we show that the demand function 
implies the K L  curve. Section 6 then first shows that the unit root is a prominent
The main result of the thesis can be summarized as follows:
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feature of the model and it then explores where the unit root comes from. F in a lly  
the unit root is like ly to be at the heart of the problems of convergence of the 
algorithms in  Section 8. I th ink there is some scope for further work there that 
would look into conceptualizing that result further and explore it  as theory of the 
origins of fluctuations as an alternative to the two existing paradigms of real business 
cycles and sunspots.
Now let me consider some of the lim itations of the work.
Consider first the subject of growth differentials. C learly here the most important 
lim itation  is that the size of each economy, a, is given. One of the crucial components 
of a more general model would be the endogenous determination of product varieties, 
as in the Grossman and Helpman (1992) strand of the literature. In principle, the 
main idea of this thesis should be unchanged. As long as we can define a price level 
for each country, and as long as the size of the product spectrum occupied by each 
economy remains constant in the long run, we can construct a model w ith growth 
differentials by relative price adjustments. In fact relative price adjustments not 
only allows for countries to grow at different rates, they also allow sectors w ith in  a 
country to grow at different rates. This idea was recently discussed by Kongsamut, 
Rebelo, and X ie  (1997).
Another approach to construct a model of endogenous growth w ith endogenous 
country size would be to introduce capital accumulation in  the Dornbusch, Fisher, 
and Samuelson (1977)24 model. This is in it ia lly  just a Ricardo model where there 
is no capital at all. To allow for endogenous growth one would need to consider 
a more general form where human capital and physical cap ita l jo in tly  determine 
production, and where the comparative costs (the function a(z) of the paper) are 
determined by the country-specific factor plus perhaps a human capital ingredient. 
As far as I know, nobody has taken up the challenge.
Another, much simpler variation of the model that I propose in  this paper is 
to model a heterogenous private sector, for example composed out of overlapping 
generation a la  A lla is  (1947)-Samuelson (1958)-Diamond (1965). It is known since 
Gale (1971) and Gale (1974) that in this model, trade imbalances can persist in 
the long run, i.e. there are steady states w ith imbalance of trade. Overlapping 
generations would allow for an additional degree of freedom and make the condition 
for the existence of a steady state w ith imbalanced growth less stringent. A  problem 
w ith this approach w ith in  the contents of the model here is the indeterm inacy of the 
d istribution of income between households of different generations. The conventional 
approach, pioneered by Diamond (1965) has been to endow the young w ith a unit 
of labour, let them work for a period and then buy the capital stock. The old live 
on the proceeds of the capital stock and supply no labour. It has been shown by 
Jones and Manuelli (1992) that w ith in that type of scenario, endogenous growth is 
impossible, because the capital stock becomes so large that the young can no longer 
purchase it. A  simple approach for our purpose here would be to exogenously fix a 
fraction of income that is owned by the young, but this is rather ad hoc. Another,
240bstfeld and Rogoff (1996) have recently discussed a dynamic version that model.
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slightly more Stalin istic approach would be to put all income into the hand of the 
state and then to allow for the state to distribute income, but then it  is not clear 
why one would have distortionary taxes in the model as well.
For the time-consistency issues, the most important lim it of the work here is 
the linear-quadratic framework. This poses two problems. On a technical level it 
requires each model to be of a linear quadratic form. W ith  each new non-linear model 
we need first to derive the linear-quadratic approximation. The linearisation of the 
model itse lf is not a problem, but the quadratification of u tility  is a serious challenge 
for an economist. One important message that I learned from doing it is that the 
consequences of getting things wrong here are usually that the computer programme 
does not converge, or only converges under heavy instrument penalties etc. Only 
if  the quadratic u tility  function is exactly right then the computer programme w ill 
run and give meaningful results. In this thesis I use a really simple model, for more 
complicated models the calculation of the linear-quadratic approximation would be 
practica lly  infeasible. I am not sure how it could be done on a computer, given the 
fact that it  involves an infinite time horizon.
Another serious obstacle is the problem of multiple solutions. Models of the 
genre considered here in this thesis can have multiple long run equilibria. The 
problem w ith calculating these equilibria is the presence of forward-looking variables 
like consumption. To know consumption we need to know the future states of the 
system. Bu t these again depend on the variables being set today etc. Linearisation 
avoids that catch-22 situation. It arb itrary fixes a long run and provided that the 
model is stable, it  w ill return to that long run. Since the fu ll model behaves like 
the linear model only for an infin ite ly small displacement, we know nothing about 
the behaviour of the non-linear model for any finite sized shock. There is no reason 
why a model that has been displaced from an in it ia l steady state should go back to 
it. There is nothing wrong w ith assuming that it does. However since we need to 
know the long run trajectory, we can only use a linear approximation to calculate 
the transition of the model from its displaced state to the assumed steady state.
If the calculation of the trajectory for an arbitrary shock cannot be done for 
a fu ll non-linear model, it is even more impossible to calculate a time-consistent 
policy. I suspect that the non-linear features of the model do in fact stabilise the 
model, although I have nothing to back up that conviction. In the particu lar model 
that I look at here, one important feature seems to me that there is an optimal 
steady state; this is a steady state such that a reoptim isation departing from this 
steady state does not yield any further u tility  gain. I have not formally proven that 
here. Bu t if  this property holds then we do know that the model does have a stable 
optimum long run and that once the policymaker reaches this long run it  w ill stay 
there. For this case— I think— it should be possible to calculate an approximation 
to the time-consistent trajectory that w ill lead to this long-run steady state.
We know that the time-consistent policy is a function /(•) that maps the current 
state y(t) of the system into the policy variables w(t). In a first stage, we can 
calculate the optimal steady state, by considering the static problem of picking 
the optim al steady state out of a ll steady states, regardless of transitory dynamics.
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This leads to an optimal steady state z, w ith an instrument choice of w. Once the 
government has reached the steady state say y(t), it  can not improve on it. Th is 
imposes the restriction w  = / ( y). One possib ility is of course to set a functional 
form for /(•), and then calculate the optimal solution under the constraint of the 
functional form. Given the number of functional forms and variables, this should be 
difficult. Any solution would be strictly  time-consistent, but would only be optim al 
for the particu lar class of policy functions under consideration. C learly the choice of 
a functional form of /(•) has important implications on the form that the adjustment 
path w ill take.
Continue to assume that the model has an optimal steady state. Tha t is a steady- 
state which the government would not move away from. Then we know that the 
government would like to reach that steady state in  the long run, the only problem is 
that it  can not reach it  immediately or that reaching it immediately may be costly. 
We can then try to iterate over the number of periods that it  takes the government 
to reach the steady state, and w ith a large number of periods we may be able to 
closely approximate this po licy25. Maybe, in my next life, I w ill try  to calculate that 
iteration.
25More formally, consider a model with transitory dynamics, where the state is y (t) =  [z (t),x (t)], 
where z is a vector if predetermined variable and x a vector of free variables. Then the 
model is represented as y (t) =  m (z (t — l ) ,x (t  — 1 ) , w (t)), where x ( t — 1 ) =  g (y (t ) ,y (t  +  1 ),
One possible policy is to pass immediately from y(0) to y. This policy should be feasible if 
y(0) is not too far from y. In this setting we have completely characterized the state of the
system. We know that y  takes the values y (0 ) ,y ,y ,   That allows us to compute x (t) =
g(y, y , . . . ,  w (l ) ,w , w , . . . ) .  This will then allow to calculate w ( l )  as a function of y(0).
Then allow the government to get to the optimal steady state in two periods. Here the trajectory 
is y (0 ) ,y ( l ) ,y ,y ,  * • • )* Since we have calculated welfare from period 2 onwards as a function of 
y ( l ) ,  the optimal solution is found by minimising the discounted utility over both periods. This 
defines an iterative procedure to find the optimal policy. These iterations will not lead to a time 
consistent policy because a later government can always reexamine the length of the interval by 
which it will converge. However if the number of iterations is large enough, one should hope that 
one approaches the time-consistent policy.
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A  The Solution Procedures in a Single Country
A . l  S e tt in g  up  the  lin e a r  ve rs io n
The model of Section 5.1 can be expressed in state-space form as
zt+i
xt+i,t.
= A
St — E]
zt
x t_
'zt
Xt
i B w i
-f- E 2
(A.1)
(A.2)
where z t is an np x  1 vector of predetermined variables at time t. x t is an nf x  1 
vector of free variables, and x ®+11 denotes rational expectations of x t+i. In our 
model there are only three non-predetermined variables, consumption and the two 
forward-looking variables for government policy, therefore nf = 3. st is an nt x  1 
vector of target variables, expressed as deviation from a bliss point. In our model 
the bliss point for consumption and government consumption are 100% of GD P, and 
the bliss point for growth is 100% as well. O f course these points can not be achieved 
simultaneously at any date, therefore the welfare loss w ill be strictly  positive. The 
loss of the government is written as
- oo
J, = T / ^ T s , +f (A.3)
t'=0
where T  is a symmetric and positive definite m atrix of weights and g >  0 is the 
discount factor. The policymaker’s optim ization problem is to m inim ize Ut subject 
to the model (A . l)  and the in it ia l vector z t. Substituting (A.2) in  (A.3) w ill give 
the following form of the welfare loss
1 00i^ =  T /  [yj-c- Q  yt+i- + 2 y 2b u  w l+t,
2 7To (a -4)
+ wJ.,,Rwl+(]
Where we use the definitions Q  = E j" Y E i ,  U  = Ej" T E 2, and R  = E J  T E 2. We 
also introduce the notation y j  = [ z j , x^] aa the state vector, of dimension ns x  1 , 
where ns = np + nf. For the vectors that have the dimension ns x  1 , it  is convenient 
to partition the vector into the first np elements and the nf elements that follow. 
Using this notation, for example
yt = yP,t
LYf,tJ
(A.5)
where here of course y P)t = z t and y p = zt. It is also inconvenient to introduce a 
sim ilar notation for matrices. Let X  be any m atrix of dimension ns x  ns, then write
X  =
X
X
p,p
f,p
Xp,f
X f,f j
(A .6)
such that X P)P is of dimension np x np X f iP is of dimension nf x  np X P)f is of dimension 
np x nf and X f sf is of dimension nf x  nf. We w ill make repeated use of this notation 
in the remainder of the appendix, when we develop the solution procedures for both 
the precommitment and the time consistent case.
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A .2 The optim al policy w ith  precom mitment
To find the optimum policy under precommitment, consider the government’s ex- 
ante optimum policy at t = 0 under the assumption that precommitment is possible. 
B y  standard theory of Lagrangian multipliers, we then m inim ize the Lagrangian
£o — Uo + [A  y t + B  w t — y t+i] (A.7)
t=o
with respect to {y t} g 0, {A t}£20> and {w t}£20, for a given z0. Th is gives the first 
order conditions that
w, =  - R - 1 [e B t  A ,+1 + U T y,] (A. 8)
U  w t = A l -  8 A t  A l+1 -  Q  yt (A.9)
together w ith the original constraint
y l+i = A  y t + B  w t (A. 10)
Equations (A .8), (A.9) and (A .10) hold for t  > 1. They can be written in state-space 
form as
( A . l l)
I g B R -1B T yt+i'
0 e t A T -UR-'B7), Al+1_
A  — B  R -1  U T 0 
- Q  + U R - 1 U t  I
yt
At
The solution to ( A . l l)  requires 2 ns boundary conditions. The first order condi­
tion in t = 0, requires that
A0 dy0 =0 (A.12)
W ith in  yo the first np elements are predetermined, therefore dy£ — 0, whereas the 
nf elements that follow are free and therefore require from (A.12) that
Af, o = 0 (A.13)
Th is gives nf boundary conditions to solve ( A . l l) .  The in it ia l value z 0 gives np more 
conditions. F in a lly  the transversality condition
lim  qi A t = 0t-+oo (A.14)
provides ns more conditions, which complete to the required 2 ns boundary condi­
tions. The solution takes the form
At = S yt
w t = -  (R  + B t S B ) _1 ( B t S A  + U t ) yt 
= - F y i
Substituting into (A.9) we get
(A.15)
(A.16)
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S = Q -  U F - F t U t  + F t R F  
+ ( A - 0 B F ) t S ( A - B F )
say, where S is the solution to the Ricatti matrix equation
(A. 17)
A ll that is not left to complete the solution is to express the non-predetermined 
variables at time t, [ A j t A j j  in  terms of the predetermined variables [z J  A j t] . 
Rearranging (A. 15), we obtain
Ap,i
. xt.
Sp,p - S- sf,p sPjfsf7fJ 
- S J  Sf,p 0-1° f , f
Zt
Ap,u
z t
Ap,tj
(A .18)
= - N
say Substituting into (A. 16) gives
w t = —F  
= G
say, and combining (A .10), (A.16) and (A.18) gives
0HH
 
1 _
l
N
N f)P —  N f , f
z t
Ap,ij
(A.19)
2t+i
lA p,i+i.
= T  (A  -  B F )  T -1 
= H  [ *
Zt
APit_
where T  =
I
.®f,p
0
Sf,f
(A .20)
say. G iven the solution S to the R ica tti equation (A. 17), equations (A.18) to (A.20) 
completely characterize the solution to the optim ization problem. The solution can 
be expressed as a feedback on the history of the state vectors. A t t = 0, this feedback 
is simply given by (A.19). To find the feedback for the following periods, use (A.20) 
to write
Ap>t+i — K f jP z t + H f(f AP)t 
Solving (A .21) and using (A .12), we find
t
Ap,m  =  H fiP E ( H f ,f ) ‘V f
t'=0
(A .21)
(A .22)
Hence the feedback form of the rule w t = G p z t + G f Afit can be expressed solely in 
terms of the (at time t) predetermined variables z t.
F in a lly  let us evaluate the welfare loss along the trajectory or “cost-to-go” . From 
the envelope theorem and the first order condition (A .12), we have that
d U
dy0 dy0
d£° _  T
—  A n (A.23)
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Hence from (A. 15) on integration we have
Uo =  1 y(T S y 0 (A.24)
at time t7 = 0. A t time t this becomes
1  T
Ui = 2 y'Sy‘ (A.25)
Another way of expressing Uh which w ill proof useful, is found by elim inating x t in 
(A.25) using (A.18). We obtain
A . 3 T h e  t im e  con s is ten t (M a rko v -p e rfe c t)  so lu t io n
The precommitment solutions takes the feedback form of a rule (A. 19) which as 
we have seen from (A .21) is a rule w ith memory. The time-inconsistency of this 
solution is best seen by examining the cost-to-go (A.25). Re-optim ising at time t 
and reneging on the commitment given at time 0 involves putting AP)t = 0. Thus 
the gains from reneging are —trace(N fjf APjt A j t). Since it  can be shown that N fsf is 
negative definite (Currie and Levine (1994), chapter 5, page 145 for a formal proof), 
it follows that everywhere along the trajectory at which Af)t % 0 there w ill be gains 
from reneging and the ex ante optimal policy w ill be suboptimal ex post.
In order to construct a time-consistent policy we employ dynamic programming 
and seek a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which instruments are s t ill allowed to 
depend on the past history, but only through a feedback on the current value of 
the state variables. Th is precludes feedback as in (A .21) which involves memory. 
Thus we seek a stationary solution w t = G  zt in which Ut is m inim ized at the time t 
subject to the model (A .2) in the knowledge that an identical procedure w ill be used 
to determine Ut+ i at time t + 1 . Other features of the solution are the x t/ = —N  z t', 
which we know is true of saddle-path stable solutions to rational expectations models 
under a rule w t/ = - F z t<, and Ut = z j  S z t. Notice that a ll three solution features 
follow from the precommitment solution w ith Ap>t = 0 for all t. The solution is 
completely characterized by the matrices F , N  and S. We now derive an iterative 
procedure and sequences F t, N t and S t which— if  convergent— converge to the these 
stationary values. Suppose that from time t + 1 onwards,
Ut = - - [trace (N P)P z t z j )  + trace(N fjf APit A j jt)] 
which at t = 0, using (A. 13) becomes
(A.26)
(A .27)
xt+t' = -N t+ i z t+t/ V t' > 1 (A .28)
Then from (A .l)
Xt+i — —N t+i ( A P)P z t + A P)f x t + B p w t) 
= A fiP z t + A f)f x t + B f w t
(A.29)
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Thus
x t = J t zt + K t Wi (A.30)
where
Jt = — (A fff *f N t+i A Pjf) 1 (N l+1 A P)P + A f>p) (A .31)
K t = — (A fjf + N t+1 A P)f)-1 (N l+1 B p + B f) (A.32)
Rewrite (A .4) as
Ui = \  (ytT Q  Y i + 2 y tT u  w t + w tT R w t) + q Ui+1 (A.33)
then putting Ui+i  = zj+ l S t+1 z t+i/2, and substituting for x t from (A.30), we obtain 
Ui = j  (z )  Qt z t + 2 z j  U t wt + w tT R t w t) + £ z t+i St+i z w-i (A.34)
where
Q t = Qp,p + Jt" Qf,p + Qp,f J t  + J^ Qf,f J t  (A .35)
U , = Up + Qp,f K ,  + JU, + J j  Q f,f J t (A. 36)
R ,  = R  + U fT K ,  + U f + Q f,f K t (A.37)
S im ilarly  elim inate x t from (A .l)  to obtain
zt+i = A t z t + B t w t (A .38)
where
A t = A PjP + A P)f J t (A.39)
B t = B p + A p>fK t (A.40)
Hence substituting (A.38) into (A.34) we arrive at
Ut — 2 [ZJ  (Qt + Q A t  S t+i  A t) z t
+ 2 z^"(Ut + q At*"St+i Bt) Wt (A .41)
+ (R t + qB>J S t+i  B t) w t]
The control problem is now to m inim ize Ut w ith respect to w t given the current state 
z t. and given S t+i and N t+i which are determined by subsequent reoptimisation. 
The first order condition is then
w t = (R t + S t+1 B t) -1^ ^  + qA J  S (+1 B t) z t 
= G fZl
say. Then combining (A.30) and (A.42) we have
x l = ( J l - K , G , ) z t (A.43)
= - N cz i (A.44)
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S t =  Q i  + U t G l +  G / u /  +  G / R t G l 
+  ( A t +  B ( G e )T S i+ 1 (g  A i  +  B t G t )
Given S i+1 and N t+i equations (A.42), (A.43) and (A.45) give F t , N t, and S t defining 
our iterative process. If these converge26 to stationary values F ,  N  and S, then we 
have a time-consistent optimal rule w* = G  z t, w ith cost to go
Ut = \  z j  S z t = trace(S Z t) (A.46)
/j *6
say. Substituting (A.42) into (A.41) and equating the quadratic terms in zt gives
26 We have not found any problems with convergence for a wide range of models, including that 
in this paper
B The Solution Procedures for the two country game
Replace the subscription t in Section 5.1 w ith t + 1 and take expectations at time t. 
The model can then be expressed in state-space form as
Zt+l
Lx t+i,tJ
st =  E i
st = Ei
Zt
,x t.
'zt
.x t.
'Zi
X t
+ B
+ E ,
+ Er
w t
Lw*j
W t
w tJ
w t
L w t*J
(B .l)
(B.2)
(B-3)
where z t is an np x 1 vector of predetermined variables at time t, x t is an nf x  1 vector 
of free variables, and x f+11 denotes rational expectations of x t+i formed at time t on 
the basis of the information set {zt ' ,xt/,tH- 1 < t}. w t and w£ are nj x  1 vectors of 
instruments available to the domestic and foreign governments, respectively. st and 
are nt x  1 vectors of target variables for the domestic and foreign government, 
respectively, both expressed as deviation from a bliss point.
The loss of the domestic government is written as
1
(B .4 )
t'=0
where T  is a symmetric and positive definite m atrix of weights and g >  0 is the 
discount factor. The policymaker’s optim ization problem is to m inim ize Ui subject 
to the model (B .l)  and the in it ia l vector z t. Substituting (B.2) in (B.4) w ill give the 
following form of the welfare loss
. oo
Ui = -r /  [ y T , ,  Q  y l + t . + 2 y j . , ,  U
t'=0
w t+t-
4- w  J+l, R
w l+i 
w"t+t'J
(B.5)
Where we use the definitions Q  = Ej" T Ei, U  = Ej" T  E2, and R  = E j  T  E2. We 
also introduce the notation = [z^x^] is the state vector, of dimension ns x  1 , 
where ns = np + nf. For the foreign government, the welfare loss is
t/. = T / 4  r*sw (B.6)
t'=0
which, using B.3 yields an expression isomorph to B.5 that is not reproduced here.
For the vectors that have the dimension ns x 1 , it  is convenient to partition the 
vector into the first np element and the nf elements that follow. Using this notation, 
for example
yt = yP,i.yf,t.
(B.7)
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where here of course y Pjt = z t and y p = z t. It is also inconvenient to introduce a 
sim ilar notation for matrices. Let X  be any m atrix of dimension ns x  ns, then write
X  = Xp,p X Psf 
, X f)p Xf,f.
(B.8)
such that X P)P is of dimension np x np X f>p is of dimension nf x  np X P)f is of dimension 
np x  nf and X f>f is of dimension nf x  nf. In addition, portion B  into the part that 
corresponds to the domestic and the foreign instrument
B  =
B
B" (B.9)
and adopt the same notation for E 2 and E 2. We w ill make repeated use of these no- 
tational conventions in the remainder of the appendix, when we develop the solution 
procedures.
B . l  T h e  co o p e ra t iv e  o p t im a l p o l ic y  w ith  re p u ta t io n
To compute this equilibrium  we assume that g =  g*. The target to maximise is
1 o° r
u? = 9 E  f  {y,L Q c yt+f + 2 u<
t'=0
w t+i/
Vi+V.
+  W  J+l, R 1 w t+i'
w;t+i'J
(B .10)
where Q c = a  Q  + (1 — a) Q * U C = a  U  + (1 — a:) U* and R c = a  R  + (1 — a) R*. 
B y  standard theory of Lagrangian multipliers, we then m inim ise the Lagrangian
Bo = Uq + £4At' [A  y t + B  w f — yt+i]
t=0
with respect to {yt}£?0, {A t}£?0, and {w £}g0, where w£ = [wt,w*]. Th is gives the 
first order conditions that
w f = - R c_1 [p B T A (+1 + U cT y t] 
U°w? = A t - e A T A t+1- Q cy,
together w ith the original constraint
y t+1 = A  y t + B  w ct
(B.12)
(B.13)
(B.14)
Equations (B.12), (B.13) and (B.14) hold for t > 1. They can be written in state- 
space form as
‘I e B  R c_1 B T ]  ry ,+1
0 e (A T - U cR c- 1B T)J [a 1+1, 
' A - B R c_1U cT 0] [y,'
—Q° +  U c R c_1 U cT 11 I A t
(B.15)
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The solution to (B.15) requires 2ns boundary conditions. The first order condition 
in t = 0, requires that
A j d y 0 = 0 (B.16)
W ith in  y 0 the first np elements are predetermined, therefore d yp = 0, whereas the 
nf elements that follow are free and therefore require from (B.16) that
Af,o — 0 (B.17)
This gives nf boundary condition to solve (B.15). The in it ia l value z0 gives np more 
conditions. F in a lly  the transversality condition
lim  q1 A t = 0l-+oo (B.18)
provides ns more conditions, which complete to the required 2 ns boundary condi­
tions. The solution takes the form
At =  S° y i  (B .19)
Substituting into (B .13) we get
w f = -  (R c + B t  Sc B ) _1 ( B t  Sc A  + U cT) y,
= - F c y t
say, where S c is the solution to the R ica tt i m atrix equation
Sc = Q c ~ U c F c -  F cT U cT + F cT R c F c 
+ ( A - B F c)t Sc ( A - B F C)
Finally, to complete the solution we express the non-predetermined variables at time 
t, [Ap t A j j  in terms of the predetermined variables [ z j  A j t] . Rearranging 
(B .19), we obtain
(B.22)
(B.20)
(B.21)
\ > , t
'Q C  q c  — 1 Q C ,
°  p . p  °  f , f  D  f>p
Q C  Q C  — 1 ]
°  P J 2 * f , f ' z t ’
.  x t . ~ act f  S cf,p
Q C  — 1
D f,f J .^2,1.
= —N c
say. Substituting into (B.20) gives
w ct = — F c
= G c
zt
2^,1
0 ’ z t ’
,A2)t_
zt
,A2)t.
(B.23)
say, and combining (B.14), (B.20) and (B.22) gives
where T c =Zt+l
L^2,t+lJ
= T c (A  -  B  F c) T c_1 
=  H C Zl
,A2,t_
Zt
A2,t.
I 0
*cf,p sv. (B.24)
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say. Given the solution S c to the R ica tti equation (B.21), equations (B.22) to (B.24) 
completely characterize the solution to the optim ization problem. The solution can 
be expressed as a feedback on the history of the state vectors. A t  t = 0, this 
feedback is simply given by (B.23), w ith  t  = 0. To find the feedback for for the 
following periods, use (B.24) to write
^ 2,1+1 — K cf)P z t +  H fy f A 2}t (B.25)
Solving (B.25) and using (B.16), I find
A 2,l+1 =  H cf,p (B.26)
t '= l
Hence the feedback form of the rule w t = G cp z t + G cf A f t can be expressed solely 
in terms of the (at time t) predetermined variables z t.
F in a lly  let us evaluate the welfare loss along the trajectory or “cost-to-go” . From 
the envelope theorem and the first order condition (B.16), we have that
dU _ d£0 _ x t /p n7\
Hence from (B.19) on integration we have
*0 = s ° y 0 (B.28)
at time t' = 0. A t  time t this becomes
Ui =  ^ y,T s c y t (B.29)
Another way of expressing Ut, which w ill proof useful, is found by elim inating x t in
(B.29) using (B.22). We obtain
U{ =  -  i  [trace (N p>p z t z j )  + trace (N£f A2)t A j t)] (B.30)
which at t = 0, using (B.17) becomes
Do = ~  [trace(NP]P z0 z j ) ]  (B.31)
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The solution here is very sim ilar to the one developed in Subsection A .3. To sum 
up, we develop an iterative scheme
J f  = —(A f,f + N f+l A t,p) - 1(N f+1 A PiP + A f,p)
K f  =  - ( A fif + N f+1 A y ) " 1 (N f+1 B p + B f)
N f  = - J f  + K f  G f
G f  = (R f + e B y  S l+1 B t) (U f + g B j S l+1 A t)
Q f = Q p P + J f T Q fp + Q cp,f J f  + J f T Q y  J f  (B.32)
U f  = U '  + Q ” ,f K f  + J f T U f  + J f T Q y  J f  
R f  = R  + U cfT K f  + K f T U f  + K f T Q f, K f  
S, = Q f + U f  G f  + G fT U f T + G fT R f  G f  
+ e (A , + B , G f ) T S f+1(A , + B ,  G f)
If the system converges, then the solution is given by
w, = F c z, (B.33)
x f = N c z t (B.34)
where
Zt+1 =  [A P)P +  A P)f J c -  (B p +  A p,f K c) F c] z t (B.35)
B .3  T h e  T N  reg im e  o f  n on -coo pe ra t io n  w ith o u t  re p u ta t io n
The T C  regime is a Nash equilibrium. It is found by iterating the sequence (B.32) 
between the players, each one in turn updating their decisions and take the others’ as 
given. A C E S  does that by stating with the domestic policy maker, then the private 
sector, then the foreign policy maker,then the private sector again, before returning 
to the domestic policy maker. L itt le  is known about the convergence properties of 
this algorithm but it  turns out to be quite robust.
B.2 The TC regime of cooperation w ithout reputation
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